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/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
/*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
#include "nssrenam.h"
#include "nss.h"
#include "ssl.h"
#include "sslproto.h"
#include "sslimpl.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "ssl3ext.h"
#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
#include "sslt.h"
#include "tls13con.h"
#include "tls13ech.h"
#include "tls13exthandle.h"
#include "tls13psk.h"
#include "tls13subcerts.h"
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
const SECItem *item;
SECStatus rv;
if (!serverCert->certStatusArray ||
!serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
return SECSuccess;
}
item = &serverCert->certStatusArray->items[0];
/* Only send the first entry. */
/* status_type == ocsp */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1> */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, item->data, item->len, 3);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* [RFC 8446] Section 4.2.8.
*
* struct {
* NamedGroup group;
* opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
* } KeyShareEntry;
*
*/
PRUint32
tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(const sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair)
{
/* Size = NamedGroup(2) + length(2) + opaque<?> share */
PRUint32 size = 2 + 2;
const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey;
switch (pubKey->keyType) {
case ecKey:
size += pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
break;
case dhKey:
size += pubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
if (keyPair->kemKeys) {
PORT_Assert(!keyPair->kemCt);
PORT_Assert(keyPair->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00 || keyPair->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_mlkem768x25519);
pubKey = keyPair->kemKeys->pubKey;
size += pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.len;
}
if (keyPair->kemCt) {
PORT_Assert(!keyPair->kemKeys);
PORT_Assert(keyPair->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00 || keyPair->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_mlkem768x25519);
size += keyPair->kemCt->len;
}
return size;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_WriteXyber768D00KeyExchangeInfo(sslBuffer *buf, sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair)
{
PORT_Assert(keyPair->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00);
PORT_Assert(keyPair->keys->pubKey->keyType == ecKey);
// Encode the X25519 share first, then the Kyber768 key or ciphertext.
SECStatus rv;
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, keyPair->keys->pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
keyPair->keys->pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
if (keyPair->kemKeys) {
PORT_Assert(!keyPair->kemCt);
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, keyPair->kemKeys->pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.data, keyPair->kemKeys->pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.len);
} else if (keyPair->kemCt) {
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, keyPair->kemCt->data, keyPair->kemCt->len);
} else {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_WriteMLKEM768X25519KeyExchangeInfo(sslBuffer *buf, sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair)
{
PORT_Assert(keyPair->group->name == ssl_grp_kem_mlkem768x25519);
PORT_Assert(keyPair->keys->pubKey->keyType == ecKey);
// Encode the ML-KEM-768 key or ciphertext first, then the X25519 share.
SECStatus rv;
if (keyPair->kemKeys) {
PORT_Assert(!keyPair->kemCt);
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, keyPair->kemKeys->pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.data, keyPair->kemKeys->pubKey->u.kyber.publicValue.len);
} else if (keyPair->kemCt) {
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, keyPair->kemCt->data, keyPair->kemCt->len);
} else {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, keyPair->keys->pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
keyPair->keys->pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
tls13_WriteKeyExchangeInfo(sslBuffer *buf, sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair)
{
SECStatus rv;
const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = keyPair->keys->pubKey;
switch (pubKey->keyType) {
case ecKey:
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
break;
case dhKey:
rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(buf, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
return rv;
}
SECStatus
tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(sslBuffer *buf, sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair)
{
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int size = tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(keyPair);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, keyPair->group->name, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, size - 4, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
switch (keyPair->group->name) {
case ssl_grp_kem_mlkem768x25519:
rv = tls13_WriteMLKEM768X25519KeyExchangeInfo(buf, keyPair);
break;
case ssl_grp_kem_xyber768d00:
rv = tls13_WriteXyber768D00KeyExchangeInfo(buf, keyPair);
break;
default:
rv = tls13_WriteKeyExchangeInfo(buf, keyPair);
break;
}
return rv;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRCList *cursor;
unsigned int lengthOffset;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Optimistically try to send an ECDHE key using the
* preexisting key (in future will be keys) */
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send client key share xtn",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* Save the offset to the length. */
rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
cursor != &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs;
cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor;
rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf, keyPair);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
/* GREASE KeyShareEntry:
* [The client] MAY also send KeyShareEntry values for a subset of those
* selected in the "key_share" extension. For each of these, the
* "key_exchange" field MAY be any value [RFC8701, Section 3.1].
*
* By default we do not send KeyShares for every NamedGroup so the
* ServerKeyShare handshake message / additional round-trip is not
* triggered by sending GREASE KeyShareEntries. */
if (ss->opt.enableGrease) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_group], 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
/* Entry length */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
/* Entry value */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0xCD, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
}
rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(sslReader *rdr, TLS13KeyShareEntry **ksp)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint64 group;
const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
sslReadBuffer share;
rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(rdr, 2, &group);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
groupDef = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(group);
rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(rdr, 2, &share);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* This has to happen here because we want to consume
* the entire entry even if the group is unknown
* or disabled. */
/* If the group is disabled, continue. */
if (!groupDef) {
return SECSuccess;
}
ks = PORT_ZNew(TLS13KeyShareEntry);
if (!ks) {
goto loser;
}
ks->group = groupDef;
rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &ks->key_exchange,
share.buf, share.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
*ksp = ks;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the client and copy to
* |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key
* share is processed in tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(). */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares));
TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks);
if ((rv != SECSuccess) || !ks) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) {
tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
return SECFailure;
}
PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtnHrr(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 tmp;
const sslNamedGroupDef *group;
PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension in HRR",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure; /* error code already set */
}
if (data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
group = ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)tmp);
/* If the group is not enabled, or we already have a share for the
* requested group, abort. */
if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, group) ||
ssl_HaveEphemeralKeyPair(ss, group)) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Now delete all the key shares per [draft-ietf-tls-tls13 S 4.1.2] */
ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss));
/* And replace with our new share. */
rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), group);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the server and copy to
* |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key
* share is processed in tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(). */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRUint32 length;
PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares));
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* Redundant length because of TLS encoding (this vector consumes
* the entire extension.) */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &length, 2, &data->data,
&data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
if (length != data->len) {
/* Check for consistency */
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
goto loser;
}
sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) {
TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
goto loser;
}
if (ks) {
/* |ks| == NULL if this is an unknown group. */
PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
}
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
tls13_DestroyKeyShares(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
/* There should be exactly one key share. */
PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) ==
PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf, keyPair);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Called by clients.
*
* struct {
* opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
* uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
* } PskIdentity;
*
* opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
*
* struct {
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
* case client_hello:
* PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
* PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
*
* case server_hello:
* uint16 selected_identity;
* };
*
* } PreSharedKeyExtension;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
const static PRUint8 binder[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE] = { 0 };
unsigned int binderLen;
unsigned int identityLen = 0;
const PRUint8 *identity = NULL;
PRTime age;
SECStatus rv;
/* Exit early if no PSKs or max version < 1.3. */
if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) ||
ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ...or if PSK type is resumption, but we're not resuming. */
sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume && !ss->statelessResume) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* ...or if PSKs are incompatible with negotiated ciphersuites
* (different hash algorithms) on HRR.
*
* In addition, in its updated ClientHello, the client SHOULD NOT offer any
* pre-shared keys associated with a hash other than that of the selected
* cipher suite. This allows the client to avoid having to compute partial
* hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second ClientHello
* [RFC8446, Section 4.1.4]. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry &&
(psk->hash != ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Save where this extension starts so that if we have to add padding, it
* can be inserted before this extension. */
PORT_Assert(buf->len >= 4);
xtnData->lastXtnOffset = buf->len - 4;
PORT_Assert(psk->type == ssl_psk_resume || psk->type == ssl_psk_external);
binderLen = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(psk->hash);
if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) {
/* Send a single ticket identity. */
NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
identityLen = session_ticket->ticket.len;
identity = session_ticket->ticket.data;
/* Obfuscated age. */
age = ssl_Time(ss) - session_ticket->received_timestamp;
age /= PR_USEC_PER_MSEC;
age += session_ticket->ticket_age_add;
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending Resumption PSK with identity", identity, identityLen));
} else if (psk->type == ssl_psk_external) {
identityLen = psk->label.len;
identity = psk->label.data;
age = 0;
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending External PSK with label", identity, identityLen));
} else {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Length is len(identityLen) + identityLen + len(age) */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2 + identityLen + 4, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, identity,
identityLen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, age, 4);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* Write out the binder list length. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, binderLen + 1, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/* Write zeroes for the binder for the moment. These
* are overwritten in tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, binder, binderLen, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) {
xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
loser:
xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
return SECFailure;
}
/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECItem inner;
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int numIdentities = 0;
unsigned int numBinders = 0;
SECItem *appToken;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* The application token is set via the cookie extension if this is the
* second ClientHello. Don't set it twice. The cookie extension handler
* sets |helloRetry| and that will have been called already because this
* extension always comes last. */
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
appToken = &xtnData->applicationToken;
} else {
appToken = NULL;
}
/* Parse the identities list. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &inner, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
while (inner.len) {
SECItem label;
PRUint32 obfuscatedAge;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &label, 2,
&inner.data, &inner.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (!label.len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &obfuscatedAge, 4,
&inner.data, &inner.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (!numIdentities) {
/* Check any configured external PSK for a matching label.
* If none exists, try to parse it as a ticket. */
PORT_Assert(!xtnData->selectedPsk);
for (PRCList *cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.psks;
cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) {
sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)cur_p;
if (psk->type != ssl_psk_external ||
SECITEM_CompareItem(&psk->label, &label) != SECEqual) {
continue;
}
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Using External PSK with label",
psk->label.data, psk->label.len));
xtnData->selectedPsk = psk;
}
if (!xtnData->selectedPsk) {
PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handling PreSharedKey value",
label.data, label.len));
rv = ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(
CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), &label, appToken);
/* This only happens if we have an internal error, not
* a malformed ticket. Bogus tickets just don't resume
* and return SECSuccess. */
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
/* xtnData->ticketAge contains the baseline we use for
* calculating the ticket age (i.e., our RTT estimate less the
* value of ticket_age_add).
*
* Add that to the obfuscated ticket age to recover the client's
* view of the ticket age plus the estimated RTT.
*
* See ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket() for details. */
xtnData->ticketAge += obfuscatedAge;
/* We are not committed to resumption until after unwrapping the
* RMS in tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2. The RPSK will be stored
* in ss->xtnData.selectedPsk at that point, so continue. */
}
}
}
++numIdentities;
}
xtnData->pskBindersLen = data->len;
/* Parse the binders list. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss,
&inner, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
if (data->len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
while (inner.len) {
SECItem binder;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &binder, 1,
&inner.data, &inner.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (binder.len < 32) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (!numBinders) {
xtnData->pskBinder = binder;
}
++numBinders;
}
if (numBinders != numIdentities)
goto alert_loser;
if (ss->statelessResume) {
PORT_Assert(!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk);
} else if (!xtnData->selectedPsk) {
/* No matching EPSK. */
return SECSuccess;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* We only process the first session ticket the client sends,
* so the index is always 0. */
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PRUint32 index;
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &index, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return SECFailure;
/* This should be the end of the extension. */
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
/* We only sent one PSK label so index must be equal to 0 */
if (index) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks));
sslPsk *candidate = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
/* Check that the server-selected ciphersuite hash and PSK hash match. */
if (candidate->hash != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn;
xtnData->selectedPsk = candidate;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* struct { } EarlyDataIndication;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
if (!tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* This will only be called if we also offered the extension. */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleTicketEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PRUint32 utmp;
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle ticket early_data extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp),
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->max_early_data_size = PR_ntohl(utmp);
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* struct {
* select (Handshake.msg_type) {
* case client_hello:
* ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
* case server_hello:
* ProtocolVersion version;
* };
* } SupportedVersions;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
PRUint16 version;
unsigned int lengthOffset;
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client send supported_versions extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 1, &lengthOffset);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx || ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) {
PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeVersion(version,
ss->protocolVariant);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, wire, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (ss->opt.enableDtls13VersionCompat &&
ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) {
switch (version) {
case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, (PRUint16)version, 2);
break;
default:
continue;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
/* GREASE SupportedVersions:
* A client MAY select one or more GREASE version values and advertise them
* in the "supported_versions" extension, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */
if (ss->opt.enableGrease) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_version], 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server send supported_versions extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PRUint16 ver = tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3,
ss->protocolVariant);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ver, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* struct {
* opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
* } Cookie;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleHrrCookie(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
/* IMPORTANT: this is only valid while the HelloRetryRequest is still valid. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(
ss, &CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss)->ssl3.hs.cookie, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len || data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
!ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send cookie extension", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data,
ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &xtnData->cookie, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (xtnData->cookie.len == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendPostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
/* Only one post-handshake message is supported: a single
* NST immediately following the client Finished. */
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send post_handshake_auth extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
*added = ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandlePostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle post_handshake_auth extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
if (data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Only one post-handshake message is supported: a single
* NST immediately following the client Finished. */
if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
*
* struct {
* PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
* } PskKeyExchangeModes;
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
ss->opt.noCache) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send psk key exchange modes extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode:
* A client MAY select one or more GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode values and
* advertise them in the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension, if sent
* [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */
if (ss->opt.enableGrease) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ tls13_psk_dh_ke, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->pskKem }, 2, 1);
} else {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ tls13_psk_dh_ke }, 1, 1);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle PSK key exchange modes extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* IMPORTANT: We aren't copying these values, just setting pointers.
* They will only be valid as long as the ClientHello is in memory. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss,
&xtnData->psk_ke_modes, 1,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
return rv;
if (!xtnData->psk_ke_modes.len || data->len) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_SendCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
unsigned int calen;
const SECItem *name;
unsigned int nnames;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &name, &nnames);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
if (!calen) {
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, calen, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
while (nnames) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, name->data, name->len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
++name;
--nnames;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PLArenaPool *arena;
if (!data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
return SECFailure;
}
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (!arena) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = arena;
rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs((sslSocket *)ss,
&data->data, &data->len,
&xtnData->certReqAuthorities);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
if (data->len) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
goto loser;
}
return SECSuccess;
loser:
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL;
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, SECItem *data)
{
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore certificate_authorities extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
/* NSS ignores certificate_authorities in the ClientHello */
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendHrrKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
if (!xtnData->selectedGroup) {
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->selectedGroup->name, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
PORT_Assert(xtnData->cookie.len > 0);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf,
xtnData->cookie.data, xtnData->cookie.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
if (data->len != TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {
SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client received GREASEd ECH confirmation",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client received HRR ECH confirmation",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
if (!xtnData->ech) {
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->ech->hrrConfirmation = data->data;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRCList parsedConfigs;
PR_INIT_CLIST(&parsedConfigs);
/* The [retry config] response is valid only when the server used the
* ClientHelloOuter. If the server sent this extension in response to the
* inner variant [ECH was accepted], then the client MUST abort with an
* "unsupported_extension" alert [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 5]. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
return SECFailure;
}
/* If the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the
* "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the
* "retry_configs" field set to one or more ECHConfig structures with
* up-to-date keys [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7.1]. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) {
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
/* For TLS < 1.3 the extension is unkown/unsupported. */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
} else {
/* For TLS 1.3 the extension is known but prohibited outside EE
* (see RFC8446, Section 4.2 for alert rationale). */
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
}
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
if (!xtnData->ech) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Parse the list to determine 1) That the configs are valid
* and properly encoded, and 2) If any are compatible. */
rv = tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(data, &parsedConfigs);
if (rv == SECFailure) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Don't mark ECH negotiated on rejection with retry_config.
* Save the the raw configs so the application can retry. If
* we sent GREASE ECH (no echHpkeCtx), don't apply retry_configs. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&parsedConfigs)) {
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->retryConfigs, data);
}
tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&parsedConfigs);
return rv;
}
/* Indicates support for the delegated credentials extension. This should be
* hooked while processing the ClientHello. */
SECStatus
tls13_ClientSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
/* Only send the extension if support is enabled and the client can
* negotiate TLS 1.3. */
if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
!ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Filter the schemes that are enabled and acceptable. Save these in
* the "advertised" list, then encode them to be sent. If we receive
* a DC in response, validate that it matches one of the advertised
* schemes. */
SSLSignatureScheme filtered[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES] = { 0 };
unsigned int filteredCount = 0;
SECStatus rv = ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(ss, ss->vrange.max,
PR_TRUE /* disableRsae */,
PR_FALSE /* forCert */,
MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES,
filtered,
&filteredCount);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* If no schemes available for the DC extension, don't send it. */
if (!filteredCount) {
return SECSuccess;
}
rv = ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(ss, filtered, filteredCount,
PR_FALSE /* GREASE */, buf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
SSLSignatureScheme *dcSchemesAdvertised = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme,
filteredCount);
if (!dcSchemesAdvertised) {
return SECFailure;
}
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < filteredCount; i++) {
dcSchemesAdvertised[i] = filtered[i];
}
if (xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised) {
PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised);
}
xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised = dcSchemesAdvertised;
xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised = filteredCount;
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Parses the delegated credential (DC) offered by the server. This should be
* hooked while processing the server's CertificateVerify.
*
* Only the DC sent with the end-entity certificate is to be parsed. This is
* ensured by |tls13_HandleCertificateEntry|, which only processes extensions
* for the first certificate in the chain.
*/
SECStatus
tls13_ClientHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
if (!ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials ||
ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
sslDelegatedCredential *dc = NULL;
SECStatus rv = tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential(data->data, data->len, &dc);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser; /* code already set */
}
/* When using RSA, the public key MUST NOT use the rsaEncryption OID. */
if (dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 ||
dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 ||
dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* The algorithm and expected_cert_verify_algorithm fields MUST be of a
* type advertised by the client in the SignatureSchemeList and are
* considered invalid otherwise. Clients that receive invalid delegated
* credentials MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter"
* alert. */
PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; ++i) {
if (dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised[i]) {
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found == PR_FALSE) {
goto alert_loser;
}
// Check the dc->alg, if necessary.
if (dc->alg != dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg) {
found = PR_FALSE;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; ++i) {
if (dc->alg == ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised[i]) {
found = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (found == PR_FALSE) {
goto alert_loser;
}
}
xtnData->peerDelegCred = dc;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
loser:
tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Adds the DC extension if we're committed to authenticating with a DC. */
static SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
if (tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) {
const SECItem *dc = &ss->sec.serverCert->delegCred;
SECStatus rv;
rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, dc->data, dc->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* The client has indicated support of DCs. We can't act on this information
* until we've committed to signing with a DC, so just set a callback for
* sending the DC extension later. */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
if (xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes) {
PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes);
xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes = NULL;
xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes = 0;
}
SECStatus rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, NULL,
&xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes,
&xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
if (xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes == 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Check for trailing data. */
if (data->len != 0) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
return SECFailure;
}
/* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
xtnData->peerRequestedDelegCred = PR_TRUE;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn;
return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(
ss, xtnData, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn,
tls13_ServerSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn);
}
/* Adds the ECH extension containing server retry_configs */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
const sslEchConfig *cfg = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, cfg->raw.data, cfg->raw.len, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
/* If an ECH server sends the HRR ECH extension after it accepted ECH, the
* extension's payload must be set to 8 zero bytes, these are overwritten with
* the accept_confirmation value after the required transcript calculation.
* If a client-facing/shared-mode server did not accept ECH when offered in CH
* or if ECH GREASE is enabled on the server and a ECH extension was received,
* a 8 byte random value is set as the extension's payload
* [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7].
*
* Depending on the acceptance of ECH, zero or random bytes are written to
* ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf in tls13con.c/tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(). */
SECStatus
tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* Do not send HRR ECH extension if TLS < 1.3 was negotiated OR no ECH
* extension was received OR the server is NOT in any ECH server mode AND
* ECH GREASE is NOT enabled. */
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
!xtnData->ech ||
(!ss->echPubKey && !ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch && !ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch)) {
SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server not sending HRR ECH Xtn",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server sending HRR ECH Xtn",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PR_ASSERT(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf) == TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN);
PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "grease_ech_confirmation", ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN));
rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(buf, &ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
PRUint64 xtn_type;
sslReader xtnReader = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
PR_ASSERT(ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch);
PR_ASSERT(!xtnData->ech->receivedInnerXtn);
SECStatus rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&xtnReader, 1, &xtn_type);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_inner) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&xtnReader)) {
/* Inner ECH Extension must contain only type enum */
goto alert_loser;
}
xtnData->ech->receivedInnerXtn = PR_TRUE;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn;
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
SECStatus rv;
HpkeKdfId kdf;
HpkeAeadId aead;
PRUint32 tmp;
PRUint8 configId;
SECItem senderPubKey;
SECItem encryptedCh;
PRUint32 xtn_type;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &xtn_type, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_outer && xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_inner) {
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: unexpected ECH extension type in client hello outer, alert",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
goto alert_loser;
}
/* If we are operating in shared mode, we can accept an inner xtn in the ClientHelloOuter */
if (xtn_type == ech_xtn_type_inner) {
if (!ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
if (!xtnData->ech) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* We have to rewind the buffer advanced by ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber */
data->data--;
data->len++;
return tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(ss, xtnData, data);
}
if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) {
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle outer ECH extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
if (!xtnData->ech) {
return SECFailure;
}
/* Parse the KDF and AEAD. */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
kdf = (HpkeKdfId)tmp;
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
aead = (HpkeAeadId)tmp;
/* config_id */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 1,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
configId = tmp;
/* enc */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &senderPubKey, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* payload, which must be final and non-empty. */
xtnData->ech->payloadStart = data->data + 2; /* Move past length */
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &encryptedCh, 2,
&data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (data->len || !encryptedCh.len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
/* In the real ECH HRR case, config_id and enc should be empty. This
* is checked after acceptance, because it might be GREASE ECH. */
if (!senderPubKey.len) {
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->senderPubKey, &senderPubKey);
if (rv == SECFailure) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->innerCh, &encryptedCh);
PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "CT for ECH Decryption", encryptedCh.data, encryptedCh.len));
if (rv == SECFailure) {
return SECFailure;
}
xtnData->ech->configId = configId;
xtnData->ech->kdfId = kdf;
xtnData->ech->aeadId = aead;
/* Not negotiated until tls13_MaybeAcceptEch. */
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
tls13_SendEmptyGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
if (!ss->opt.enableGrease ||
(!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) ||
(ss->sec.isServer && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
tls13_SendGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
if (!ss->opt.enableGrease ||
(!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) ||
(ss->sec.isServer && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ 0x00 }, 1, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
ssl3_SendCertificateCompressionXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
{
/* enum {
* zlib(1),
* brotli(2),
* zstd(3),
* (65535)
* } CertificateCompressionAlgorithm;
*
* struct {
* CertificateCompressionAlgorithm algorithms<2..2^8-2>;
* } CertificateCompressionAlgorithms;
*/
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
if (ss->ssl3.cwSpec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: certificate_compression_algorithm extension requires TLS1.3 and above",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
return SECSuccess;
}
size_t certificateCompressionAlgorithmsLen = ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount;
if (certificateCompressionAlgorithmsLen == 0) {
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s does not support any certificate compression algorithm",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
return SECSuccess;
}
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s sends certificate_compression_algorithm extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
PORT_Assert(certificateCompressionAlgorithmsLen < (0x1u << 8) - 1);
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, certificateCompressionAlgorithmsLen << 1, 1);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < certificateCompressionAlgorithmsLen; i++) {
rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[i].id, 2);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
xtnData->certificateCompressionAdvertised = PR_TRUE;
*added = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
const char *
ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(const sslSocket *ss, SSLCertificateCompressionAlgorithmID alg)
{
for (int i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount; i++) {
if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[i].id == alg) {
return ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[i].name;
}
}
return "unknown";
}
SECStatus
ssl3_HandleCertificateCompressionXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
SECItem *data)
{
/* This extension is only supported with TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and newer;
* if TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] or earlier is negotiated, the peers MUST ignore this extension.
*/
if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore certificate_compression extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PRUint32 lengthSupportedAlgorithms = 0;
PRUint32 certComprAlgId = 0;
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s handles certificate_compression_algorithm extension",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &lengthSupportedAlgorithms, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Each of the algorithm is 2 bytes. */
if (lengthSupportedAlgorithms % 2 != 0) {
goto alert_loser;
}
if (data->len != lengthSupportedAlgorithms) {
goto alert_loser;
}
SECStatus algFound = SECFailure;
/* We use the first common algorithm we found. */
for (int i = 0; i < lengthSupportedAlgorithms / 2; i++) {
rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &certComprAlgId, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto alert_loser;
}
SSLCertificateCompressionAlgorithmID alg = (SSLCertificateCompressionAlgorithmID)certComprAlgId;
if (alg == 0) {
SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: certificate compression ignores reserved algorithm %02x",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, alg));
continue;
}
for (int j = 0; j < ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithmsCount; j++) {
if (ss->ssl3.supportedCertCompressionAlgorithms[j].id == alg) {
xtnData->compressionAlg = alg;
xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_certificate_compression_xtn;
algFound = SECSuccess;
break;
}
}
if (algFound == SECSuccess) {
break;
}
}
if (algFound == SECSuccess) {
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: %s established certificate compression algorithm %s",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss),
ssl3_mapCertificateCompressionAlgorithmToName(ss, xtnData->compressionAlg)));
} else {
SSL_TRC(30, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: no common certificate compression algorithms found on the %s side",
SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, SSL_ROLE(ss)));
}
return SECSuccess;
alert_loser:
ssl3_ExtDecodeError(ss);
return SECFailure;
}