Source code
Revision control
Copy as Markdown
Other Tools
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
/*
* This file implements the Symkey wrapper and the PKCS context
* Interfaces.
*/
#include <stddef.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#include "nssilock.h"
#include "secmodi.h"
#include "secmodti.h"
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "hasht.h"
static ECPointEncoding pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey);
static void
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
}
static void
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
}
/*
* pk11_getKeyFromList returns a symKey that has a session (if needSession
* was specified), or explicitly does not have a session (if needSession
* was not specified).
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_getKeyFromList(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool needSession)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
PZ_Lock(slot->freeListLock);
/* own session list are symkeys with sessions that the symkey owns.
* 'most' symkeys will own their own session. */
if (needSession) {
if (slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead) {
symKey = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead;
slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey->next;
slot->keyCount--;
}
}
/* if we don't need a symkey with its own session, or we couldn't find
* one on the owner list, get one from the non-owner free list. */
if (!symKey) {
if (slot->freeSymKeysHead) {
symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead;
slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next;
slot->keyCount--;
}
}
PZ_Unlock(slot->freeListLock);
if (symKey) {
symKey->next = NULL;
if (!needSession) {
return symKey;
}
/* if we are getting an owner key, make sure we have a valid session.
* session could be invalid if the token has been removed or because
* we got it from the non-owner free list */
if ((symKey->series != slot->series) ||
(symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &symKey->sessionOwner);
}
PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
return symKey;
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
/* if we are here, we need a session, but couldn't get one, it's
* unlikely we pk11_GetNewSession will succeed if we call it a second
* time. */
return NULL;
}
symKey = PORT_New(PK11SymKey);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
symKey->next = NULL;
if (needSession) {
symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &symKey->sessionOwner);
PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
symKey = NULL;
}
} else {
symKey->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
return symKey;
}
/* Caller MUST hold slot->freeListLock (or ref count == 0?) !! */
void
PK11_CleanKeyList(PK11SlotInfo *slot)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
while (slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead) {
symKey = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead;
slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey->next;
pk11_CloseSession(slot, symKey->session, symKey->sessionOwner);
PORT_Free(symKey);
}
while (slot->freeSymKeysHead) {
symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead;
slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next;
pk11_CloseSession(slot, symKey->session, symKey->sessionOwner);
PORT_Free(symKey);
}
return;
}
/*
* create a symetric key:
* Slot is the slot to create the key in.
* type is the mechanism type
* owner is does this symKey structure own it's object handle (rare
* that this is false).
* needSession means the returned symKey will return with a valid session
* allocated already.
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_CreateSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PRBool owner, PRBool needSession, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey = pk11_getKeyFromList(slot, needSession);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* if needSession was specified, make sure we have a valid session.
* callers which specify needSession as false should do their own
* check of the session before returning the symKey */
if (needSession && symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
symKey->type = type;
symKey->data.type = siBuffer;
symKey->data.data = NULL;
symKey->data.len = 0;
symKey->owner = owner;
symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
symKey->slot = slot;
symKey->series = slot->series;
symKey->cx = wincx;
symKey->size = 0;
symKey->refCount = 1;
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginNULL;
symKey->parent = NULL;
symKey->freeFunc = NULL;
symKey->userData = NULL;
PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
return symKey;
}
/*
* destroy a symetric key
*/
void
PK11_FreeSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
PRBool freeit = PR_TRUE;
if (!symKey) {
return;
}
if (PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&symKey->refCount) == 0) {
PK11SymKey *parent = symKey->parent;
symKey->parent = NULL;
if ((symKey->owner) && symKey->objectID != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
(void)PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_DestroyObject(symKey->session, symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
}
if (symKey->data.data) {
PORT_Memset(symKey->data.data, 0, symKey->data.len);
PORT_Free(symKey->data.data);
}
/* free any existing data */
if (symKey->userData && symKey->freeFunc) {
(*symKey->freeFunc)(symKey->userData);
}
slot = symKey->slot;
PZ_Lock(slot->freeListLock);
if (slot->keyCount < slot->maxKeyCount) {
/*
* freeSymkeysWithSessionHead contain a list of reusable
* SymKey structures with valid sessions.
* sessionOwner must be true.
* session must be valid.
* freeSymKeysHead contain a list of SymKey structures without
* valid session.
* session must be CK_INVALID_HANDLE.
* though sessionOwner is false, callers should not depend on
* this fact.
*/
if (symKey->sessionOwner) {
PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead;
slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey;
} else {
symKey->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysHead;
slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey;
}
slot->keyCount++;
symKey->slot = NULL;
freeit = PR_FALSE;
}
PZ_Unlock(slot->freeListLock);
if (freeit) {
pk11_CloseSession(symKey->slot, symKey->session,
symKey->sessionOwner);
PORT_Free(symKey);
}
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
if (parent) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(parent);
}
}
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ReferenceSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&symKey->refCount);
return symKey;
}
/*
* Accessors
*/
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
PK11_GetMechanism(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return symKey->type;
}
/*
* return the slot associated with a symetric key
*/
PK11SlotInfo *
PK11_GetSlotFromKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return PK11_ReferenceSlot(symKey->slot);
}
CK_KEY_TYPE
PK11_GetSymKeyType(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return PK11_GetKeyType(symKey->type, symKey->size);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_GetNextSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return symKey ? symKey->next : NULL;
}
char *
PK11_GetSymKeyNickname(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return PK11_GetObjectNickname(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID);
}
SECStatus
PK11_SetSymKeyNickname(PK11SymKey *symKey, const char *nickname)
{
return PK11_SetObjectNickname(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID, nickname);
}
void *
PK11_GetSymKeyUserData(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return symKey->userData;
}
void
PK11_SetSymKeyUserData(PK11SymKey *symKey, void *userData,
PK11FreeDataFunc freeFunc)
{
/* free any existing data */
if (symKey->userData && symKey->freeFunc) {
(*symKey->freeFunc)(symKey->userData);
}
symKey->userData = userData;
symKey->freeFunc = freeFunc;
return;
}
/*
* turn key handle into an appropriate key object
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PK11SymKey *parent, PK11Origin origin,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyID, PRBool owner, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
PRBool needSession = !(owner && parent);
if (keyID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
return NULL;
}
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, owner, needSession, wincx);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
symKey->objectID = keyID;
symKey->origin = origin;
/* adopt the parent's session */
/* This is only used by SSL. What we really want here is a session
* structure with a ref count so the session goes away only after all the
* keys do. */
if (!needSession) {
symKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE;
symKey->session = parent->session;
symKey->parent = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(parent);
/* This is the only case where pk11_CreateSymKey does not explicitly
* check symKey->session. We need to assert here to make sure.
* the session isn't invalid. */
PORT_Assert(parent->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (parent->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
}
return symKey;
}
/*
* Restore a symmetric wrapping key that was saved using PK11_SetWrapKey.
*
* This function is provided for ABI compatibility; see PK11_SetWrapKey below.
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_GetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
int series, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle;
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
if (slot->series != series ||
slot->refKeys[wrap] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
return NULL;
}
if (type == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
type = slot->wrapMechanism;
}
keyHandle = slot->refKeys[wrap];
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
symKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive,
slot->wrapMechanism, keyHandle, PR_FALSE, wincx);
return symKey;
}
/*
* This function sets an attribute on the current slot with a wrapping key. The
* data saved is ephemeral; it needs to be run every time the program is
* invoked.
*
* Since NSS 3.45, this function is marginally more thread safe. It uses the
* slot lock (if present) and fails silently if a value is already set. Use
* PK11_GetWrapKey() after calling this function to get the current wrapping key
* in case there was an update on another thread.
*
* Either way, using this function is inadvisable. It's provided for ABI
* compatibility only.
*/
void
PK11_SetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, PK11SymKey *wrapKey)
{
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
if (wrap >= 0) {
size_t uwrap = (size_t)wrap;
if (uwrap < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(slot->refKeys) &&
slot->refKeys[uwrap] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
/* save the handle and mechanism for the wrapping key */
/* mark the key and session as not owned by us so they don't get
* freed when the key goes way... that lets us reuse the key
* later */
slot->refKeys[uwrap] = wrapKey->objectID;
wrapKey->owner = PR_FALSE;
wrapKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE;
slot->wrapMechanism = wrapKey->type;
}
}
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
}
/*
* figure out if a key is still valid or if it is stale.
*/
PRBool
PK11_VerifyKeyOK(PK11SymKey *key)
{
if (!PK11_IsPresent(key->slot)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
return (PRBool)(key->series == key->slot->series);
}
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PK11Origin origin, PRBool isToken, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate,
unsigned int templateCount, SECItem *key, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
SECStatus rv;
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE, wincx);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
symKey->size = key->len;
PK11_SETATTRS(&keyTemplate[templateCount], CKA_VALUE, key->data, key->len);
templateCount++;
if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &symKey->data, key) != SECSuccess) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return NULL;
}
symKey->origin = origin;
/* import the keys */
rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, symKey->session, keyTemplate,
templateCount, isToken, &symKey->objectID);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return NULL;
}
return symKey;
}
/*
* turn key bits into an appropriate key object
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ImportSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
unsigned int templateCount = 0;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; /* sigh */
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[5];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
/* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
* Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
* it as a real attribute */
if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
/* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
* etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
}
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
attrs++;
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, key->len);
symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, PR_FALSE,
keyTemplate, templateCount, key, wincx);
return symKey;
}
/* Import a PKCS #11 data object and return it as a key. This key is
* only useful in a limited number of mechanisms, such as HKDF. */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ImportDataKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, PK11Origin origin,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, void *wincx)
{
CK_OBJECT_CLASS ckoData = CKO_DATA;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[2] = { { CKA_CLASS, (CK_BYTE_PTR)&ckoData, sizeof(ckoData) },
{ CKA_VALUE, (CK_BYTE_PTR)key->data, key->len } };
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
PK11GenericObject *genObject;
genObject = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, template, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template), PR_FALSE);
if (genObject == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
handle = PK11_GetObjectHandle(PK11_TypeGeneric, genObject, NULL);
/* A note about ownership of the PKCS #11 handle:
* PK11_CreateGenericObject() will not destroy the object it creates
* on Free, For that you want PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject().
* Below we import the handle into the symKey structure. We pass
* PR_TRUE as the owner so that the symKey will destroy the object
* once it's freed. This is why it's safe to destroy genObject now. */
PK11_DestroyGenericObject(genObject);
if (handle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
return NULL;
}
return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, origin, type, handle, PR_TRUE, wincx);
}
/* turn key bits into an appropriate key object */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ImportSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
unsigned int templateCount = 0;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; /* sigh */
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
/* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
* Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
* it as a real attribute */
if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
/* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
* etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
}
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
if (isPerm) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
attrs++;
/* sigh some tokens think CKA_PRIVATE = false is a reasonable
* default for secret keys */
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
attrs++;
}
attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY) &&
!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, attrs - keyTemplate, operation)) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
attrs++;
}
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, key->len);
symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, isPerm,
keyTemplate, templateCount, key, wincx);
if (symKey && isPerm) {
symKey->owner = PR_FALSE;
}
return symKey;
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_FindFixedKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *keyID,
void *wincx)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
size_t tsize = 0;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE key_id;
attrs = findTemp;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
attrs++;
if (keyID) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len);
attrs++;
}
tsize = attrs - findTemp;
PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
key_id = pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize);
if (key_id == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
return NULL;
}
return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive, type, key_id,
PR_FALSE, wincx);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ListFixedKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
int tsize = 0;
int objCount = 0;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
PK11SymKey *nextKey = NULL;
PK11SymKey *topKey = NULL;
int i, len;
attrs = findTemp;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
attrs++;
if (nickname) {
len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len);
attrs++;
}
tsize = attrs - findTemp;
PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize, &objCount);
if (key_ids == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < objCount; i++) {
SECItem typeData;
CK_KEY_TYPE type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, key_ids[i],
CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, &typeData);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (typeData.len == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
type = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)typeData.data;
}
PORT_Free(typeData.data);
}
nextKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive,
PK11_GetKeyMechanism(type), key_ids[i], PR_FALSE, wincx);
if (nextKey) {
nextKey->next = topKey;
topKey = nextKey;
}
}
PORT_Free(key_ids);
return topKey;
}
void *
PK11_GetWindow(PK11SymKey *key)
{
return key->cx;
}
/*
* extract a symmetric key value. NOTE: if the key is sensitive, we will
* not be able to do this operation. This function is used to move
* keys from one token to another */
SECStatus
PK11_ExtractKeyValue(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (symKey == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
if (symKey->data.data != NULL) {
if (symKey->size == 0) {
symKey->size = symKey->data.len;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
if (symKey->slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID, CKA_VALUE, NULL,
&symKey->data);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
symKey->size = symKey->data.len;
}
return rv;
}
SECStatus
PK11_DeleteTokenSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
if (!PK11_IsPermObject(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID)) {
return SECFailure;
}
PK11_DestroyTokenObject(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID);
symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECItem *
PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return &symKey->data;
}
/* This symbol is exported for backward compatibility. */
SECItem *
__PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return PK11_GetKeyData(symKey);
}
/*
* PKCS #11 key Types with predefined length
*/
unsigned int
pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
{
int length = 0;
switch (keyType) {
case CKK_DES:
length = 8;
break;
case CKK_DES2:
length = 16;
break;
case CKK_DES3:
length = 24;
break;
case CKK_SKIPJACK:
length = 10;
break;
case CKK_BATON:
length = 20;
break;
case CKK_JUNIPER:
length = 20;
break;
default:
break;
}
return length;
}
/* return the keylength if possible. '0' if not */
unsigned int
PK11_GetKeyLength(PK11SymKey *key)
{
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType;
if (key->size != 0)
return key->size;
/* First try to figure out the key length from its type */
keyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot, key->objectID, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
key->size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType);
if ((keyType == CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) &&
(key->type == CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN)) {
key->size = 48;
}
if (key->size != 0)
return key->size;
if (key->data.data == NULL) {
PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key);
}
/* key is probably secret. Look up its length */
/* this is new PKCS #11 version 2.0 functionality. */
if (key->size == 0) {
CK_ULONG keyLength;
keyLength = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot, key->objectID, CKA_VALUE_LEN);
if (keyLength != CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
key->size = (unsigned int)keyLength;
}
}
return key->size;
}
/* return the strength of a key. This is different from length in that
* 1) it returns the size in bits, and 2) it returns only the secret portions
* of the key minus any checksums or parity.
*/
unsigned int
PK11_GetKeyStrength(PK11SymKey *key, SECAlgorithmID *algid)
{
int size = 0;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; /* RC2 only */
SECItem *param = NULL; /* RC2 only */
CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_params = NULL; /* RC2 ONLY */
unsigned int effectiveBits = 0; /* RC2 ONLY */
switch (PK11_GetKeyType(key->type, 0)) {
case CKK_CDMF:
return 40;
case CKK_DES:
return 56;
case CKK_DES3:
case CKK_DES2:
size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key);
if (size == 16) {
/* double des */
return 112; /* 16*7 */
}
return 168;
/*
* RC2 has is different than other ciphers in that it allows the user
* to deprecating keysize while still requiring all the bits for the
* original key. The info
* on what the effective key strength is in the parameter for the key.
* In S/MIME this parameter is stored in the DER encoded algid. In Our
* other uses of RC2, effectiveBits == keyBits, so this code functions
* correctly without an algid.
*/
case CKK_RC2:
/* if no algid was provided, fall through to default */
if (!algid) {
break;
}
/* verify that the algid is for RC2 */
mechanism = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid));
if ((mechanism != CKM_RC2_CBC) && (mechanism != CKM_RC2_ECB)) {
break;
}
/* now get effective bits from the algorithm ID. */
param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid);
/* if we couldn't get memory just use key length */
if (param == NULL) {
break;
}
rc2_params = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)param->data;
/* paranoia... shouldn't happen */
PORT_Assert(param->data != NULL);
if (param->data == NULL) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
break;
}
effectiveBits = (unsigned int)rc2_params->ulEffectiveBits;
SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
param = NULL;
rc2_params = NULL; /* paranoia */
/* we have effective bits, is and allocated memory is free, now
* we need to return the smaller of effective bits and keysize */
size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key);
if ((unsigned int)size * 8 > effectiveBits) {
return effectiveBits;
}
return size * 8; /* the actual key is smaller, the strength can't be
* greater than the actual key size */
default:
break;
}
return PK11_GetKeyLength(key) * 8;
}
/*
* The next three utilities are to deal with the fact that a given operation
* may be a multi-slot affair. This creates a new key object that is copied
* into the new slot.
*/
PK11SymKey *
pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_FLAGS flags,
PRBool isPerm, PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
SECStatus rv;
PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
/* Extract the raw key data if possible */
if (symKey->data.data == NULL) {
rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
/* KEY is sensitive, we're try key exchanging it. */
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation,
flags, isPerm, symKey);
}
}
newKey = PK11_ImportSymKeyWithFlags(slot, type, symKey->origin,
operation, &symKey->data, flags, isPerm, symKey->cx);
if (newKey == NULL) {
newKey = pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation, flags, isPerm, symKey);
}
return newKey;
}
PK11SymKey *
pk11_CopyToSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(slot, type, operation, 0, PR_FALSE, symKey);
}
/*
* Make sure the slot we are in is the correct slot for the operation
* by verifying that it supports all of the specified mechanism types.
*/
PK11SymKey *
pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *type,
int mechCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = symKey->slot;
PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
PRBool needToCopy = PR_FALSE;
int i;
if (slot == NULL) {
needToCopy = PR_TRUE;
} else {
i = 0;
while ((i < mechCount) && (needToCopy == PR_FALSE)) {
if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type[i])) {
needToCopy = PR_TRUE;
}
i++;
}
}
if (needToCopy == PR_TRUE) {
slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(type, mechCount, symKey->cx);
if (slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
return NULL;
}
newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, type[0], operation, symKey);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
return newKey;
}
/*
* Make sure the slot we are in is the correct slot for the operation
*/
PK11SymKey *
pk11_ForceSlot(PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
{
return pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(symKey, &type, 1, operation);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_MoveSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool perm, PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
if (symKey->slot == slot) {
if (perm) {
return PK11_ConvertSessionSymKeyToTokenSymKey(symKey, symKey->cx);
} else {
return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey);
}
}
return pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(slot, symKey->type,
operation, flags, perm, symKey);
}
/*
* Use the token to generate a key.
*
* keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key length algorithms. A nonzero
* keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute to be added to the template
* for the key. Most PKCS #11 modules fail if you specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN
* attribute for keys with fixed length. The exception is DES2. If you
* select a CKM_DES3_CBC mechanism, this code will not add the CKA_VALUE_LEN
* parameter and use the key size to determine which underlying DES keygen
* function to use (CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN or CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN).
*
* keyType must be -1 for most algorithms. Some PBE algorthims cannot
* determine the correct key type from the mechanism or the parameters,
* so key type must be specified. Other PKCS #11 mechanisms may do so in
* the future. Currently there is no need to export this publically.
* Keep it private until there is a need in case we need to expand the
* keygen parameters again...
*
* CK_FLAGS flags: key operation flags
* PK11AttrFlags attrFlags: PK11_ATTR_XXX key attribute flags
*/
PK11SymKey *
pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
SECItem *param, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType, int keySize, SECItem *keyid,
CK_FLAGS opFlags, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE genTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = genTemplate;
int count = sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(genTemplate[0]);
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGenType;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_ULONG ck_key_size; /* only used for variable-length keys */
if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
if ((keySize != 0) && (type != CKM_DES3_CBC) &&
(type != CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD) && (type != CKM_DES3_ECB)) {
ck_key_size = keySize; /* Convert to PK11 type */
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &ck_key_size, sizeof(ck_key_size));
attrs++;
}
if (keyType != -1) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
attrs++;
}
/* Include key id value if provided */
if (keyid) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyid->data, keyid->len);
attrs++;
}
attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse);
attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue);
count = attrs - genTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(count <= sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
keyGenType = PK11_GetKeyGenWithSize(type, keySize);
if (keyGenType == CKM_FAKE_RANDOM) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
return NULL;
}
symKey = PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(slot, type, keyGenType,
param, genTemplate, count, wincx);
if (symKey != NULL) {
symKey->size = keySize;
}
return symKey;
}
/*
* Use the token to generate a key. - Public
*
* keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key length algorithms. A nonzero
* keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute to be added to the template
* for the key. Most PKCS #11 modules fail if you specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN
* attribute for keys with fixed length. The exception is DES2. If you
* select a CKM_DES3_CBC mechanism, this code will not add the CKA_VALUE_LEN
* parameter and use the key size to determine which underlying DES keygen
* function to use (CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN or CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN).
*
* CK_FLAGS flags: key operation flags
* PK11AttrFlags attrFlags: PK11_ATTR_XXX key attribute flags
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_TokenKeyGenWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
SECItem *param, int keySize, SECItem *keyid, CK_FLAGS opFlags,
PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
{
return pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(slot, type, param, -1, keySize,
keyid, opFlags, attrFlags, wincx);
}
/*
* Use the token to generate a key. keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key
* length algorithms. A nonzero keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute
* to be added to the template for the key. PKCS #11 modules fail if you
* specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute for keys with fixed length.
* NOTE: this means to generate a DES2 key from this interface you must
* specify CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN as the mechanism directly; specifying
* CKM_DES3_CBC as the mechanism and 16 as keySize currently doesn't work.
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_TokenKeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param,
int keySize, SECItem *keyid, PRBool isToken, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
PRBool weird = PR_FALSE; /* hack for fortezza */
CK_FLAGS opFlags = CKF_SIGN;
PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
if ((keySize == -1) && (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)) {
weird = PR_TRUE;
keySize = 0;
}
opFlags |= weird ? CKF_DECRYPT : CKF_ENCRYPT;
if (isToken) {
attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
}
symKey = pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(slot, type, param,
-1, keySize, keyid, opFlags, attrFlags, wincx);
if (symKey && weird) {
PK11_SetFortezzaHack(symKey);
}
return symKey;
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_KeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param,
int keySize, void *wincx)
{
return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, type, param, keySize, 0, PR_FALSE, wincx);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGenType,
SECItem *param, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs,
unsigned int attrsCount, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_RV crv;
PRBool isToken = CK_FALSE;
CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
unsigned i;
/* Extract the template's CKA_VALUE_LEN into keySize and CKA_TOKEN into
isToken. */
for (i = 0; i < attrsCount; ++i) {
switch (attrs[i].type) {
case CKA_VALUE_LEN:
if (attrs[i].pValue == NULL ||
attrs[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
return NULL;
}
keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)attrs[i].pValue;
break;
case CKA_TOKEN:
if (attrs[i].pValue == NULL ||
attrs[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL)) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
return NULL;
}
isToken = (*(CK_BBOOL *)attrs[i].pValue) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
break;
}
}
/* find a slot to generate the key into */
/* Only do slot management if this is not a token key */
if (!isToken && (slot == NULL || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type))) {
PK11SlotInfo *bestSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx);
if (bestSlot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
return NULL;
}
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(bestSlot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE, wincx);
PK11_FreeSlot(bestSlot);
} else {
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE, wincx);
}
if (symKey == NULL)
return NULL;
symKey->size = keySize;
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginGenerated;
/* Set the parameters for the key gen if provided */
mechanism.mechanism = keyGenType;
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
if (param) {
mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
}
/* Get session and perform locking */
if (isToken) {
PK11_Authenticate(symKey->slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
/* Should always be original slot */
session = PK11_GetRWSession(symKey->slot);
symKey->owner = PR_FALSE;
} else {
session = symKey->session;
if (session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
}
if (session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
return NULL;
}
crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_GenerateKey(session, &mechanism, attrs, attrsCount, &symKey->objectID);
/* Release lock and session */
if (isToken) {
PK11_RestoreROSession(symKey->slot, session);
} else {
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return NULL;
}
return symKey;
}
/* --- */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_GenDES3TokenKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyid, void *cx)
{
return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, CKM_DES3_CBC, 0, 0, keyid, PR_TRUE, cx);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ConvertSessionSymKeyToTokenSymKey(PK11SymKey *symk, void *wincx)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = symk->slot;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_RV crv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
attrs++;
PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
return NULL;
}
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CopyObject(rwsession, symk->objectID,
template, 1, &newKeyID);
PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return NULL;
}
return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL /*parent*/, symk->origin,
symk->type, newKeyID, PR_FALSE /*owner*/, NULL /*wincx*/);
}
/* This function does a straight public key wrap with the CKM_RSA_PKCS
* mechanism. */
SECStatus
PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey)
{
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE inferred = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(pubKey->keyType);
return PK11_PubWrapSymKeyWithMechanism(pubKey, inferred, NULL, symKey,
wrappedKey);
}
/* This function wraps a symmetric key with a public key, such as with the
* CKM_RSA_PKCS and CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanisms. */
SECStatus
PK11_PubWrapSymKeyWithMechanism(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, SECItem *param,
PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len;
PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_RV crv;
if (symKey == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, mechType, CKA_ENCRYPT);
if (newKey != NULL) {
symKey = newKey;
}
if (symKey->slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
return SECFailure;
}
slot = symKey->slot;
mechanism.mechanism = mechType;
if (param == NULL) {
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
} else {
mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
}
id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
if (id == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
if (newKey) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
}
return SECFailure; /* Error code has been set. */
}
session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism,
id, symKey->objectID, wrappedKey->data, &len);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
if (newKey) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return SECFailure;
}
wrappedKey->len = len;
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* this little function uses the Encrypt function to wrap a key, just in
* case we have problems with the wrap implementation for a token.
*/
static SECStatus
pk11_HandWrap(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
SECItem *inKey, SECItem *outKey)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
CK_ULONG len;
SECItem *data;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_RV crv;
slot = wrappingKey->slot;
/* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
mech.mechanism = type;
if (param) {
mech.pParameter = param->data;
mech.ulParameterLen = param->len;
} else {
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
}
session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_EncryptInit(session, &mech,
wrappingKey->objectID);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return SECFailure;
}
/* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far,
* we've gone above and beyond anyway... */
data = PK11_BlockData(inKey, PK11_GetBlockSize(type, param));
if (data == NULL) {
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
len = outKey->len;
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Encrypt(session, data->data, data->len,
outKey->data, &len);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
SECITEM_FreeItem(data, PR_TRUE);
outKey->len = len;
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* helper function which moves two keys into a new slot based on the
* desired mechanism.
*/
static SECStatus
pk11_moveTwoKeys(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE preferedOperation,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE movingOperation,
PK11SymKey *preferedKey, PK11SymKey *movingKey,
PK11SymKey **newPreferedKey, PK11SymKey **newMovingKey)
{
PK11SlotInfo *newSlot;
*newMovingKey = NULL;
*newPreferedKey = NULL;
newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mech, preferedKey->cx);
if (newSlot == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
*newMovingKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, movingKey->type,
movingOperation, movingKey);
if (*newMovingKey == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
*newPreferedKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, preferedKey->type,
preferedOperation, preferedKey);
if (*newPreferedKey == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot);
PK11_FreeSymKey(*newMovingKey);
PK11_FreeSymKey(*newPreferedKey);
*newMovingKey = NULL;
*newPreferedKey = NULL;
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* To do joint operations, we often need two keys in the same slot.
* Usually the PKCS #11 wrappers handle this correctly (like for PK11_WrapKey),
* but sometimes the wrappers don't know about mechanism specific keys in
* the Mechanism params. This function makes sure the two keys are in the
* same slot by copying one or both of the keys into a common slot. This
* functions makes sure the slot can handle the target mechanism. If the copy
* is warranted, this function will prefer to move the movingKey first, then
* the preferedKey. If the keys are moved, the new keys are returned in
* newMovingKey and/or newPreferedKey. The application is responsible
* for freeing those keys once the operation is complete.
*/
SECStatus
PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE preferedOperation,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE movingOperation,
PK11SymKey *preferedKey, PK11SymKey *movingKey,
PK11SymKey **newPreferedKey, PK11SymKey **newMovingKey)
{
/* usually don't return new keys */
*newMovingKey = NULL;
*newPreferedKey = NULL;
if (movingKey->slot == preferedKey->slot) {
/* this should be the most common case */
if ((preferedKey->slot != NULL) &&
PK11_DoesMechanism(preferedKey->slot, mech)) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/* we are in the same slot, but it doesn't do the operation,
* move both keys to an appropriate target slot */
return pk11_moveTwoKeys(mech, preferedOperation, movingOperation,
preferedKey, movingKey,
newPreferedKey, newMovingKey);
}
/* keys are in different slot, try moving the moving key to the prefered
* key's slot */
if ((preferedKey->slot != NULL) &&
PK11_DoesMechanism(preferedKey->slot, mech)) {
*newMovingKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(preferedKey->slot, movingKey->type,
movingOperation, movingKey);
if (*newMovingKey != NULL) {
return SECSuccess;
}
}
/* couldn't moving the moving key to the prefered slot, try moving
* the prefered key */
if ((movingKey->slot != NULL) &&
PK11_DoesMechanism(movingKey->slot, mech)) {
*newPreferedKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(movingKey->slot, preferedKey->type,
preferedOperation, preferedKey);
if (*newPreferedKey != NULL) {
return SECSuccess;
}
}
/* Neither succeeded, but that could be that they were not in slots that
* supported the operation, try moving both keys into a common slot that
* can do the operation. */
return pk11_moveTwoKeys(mech, preferedOperation, movingOperation,
preferedKey, movingKey,
newPreferedKey, newMovingKey);
}
/*
* This function does a symetric based wrap.
*/
SECStatus
PK11_WrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param,
PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, PK11SymKey *symKey,
SECItem *wrappedKey)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len;
PK11SymKey *newSymKey = NULL;
PK11SymKey *newWrappingKey = NULL;
SECItem *param_save = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* force the keys into same slot */
rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(type, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_WRAP,
symKey, wrappingKey,
&newSymKey, &newWrappingKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* Couldn't move the keys as desired, try to hand unwrap if possible */
if (symKey->data.data == NULL) {
rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
return SECFailure;
}
}
if (param == NULL) {
param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type, NULL);
}
rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data, wrappedKey);
if (param_save)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param_save, PR_TRUE);
return rv;
}
if (newSymKey) {
symKey = newSymKey;
}
if (newWrappingKey) {
wrappingKey = newWrappingKey;
}
/* at this point both keys are in the same token */
slot = wrappingKey->slot;
mechanism.mechanism = type;
/* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
if (param == NULL) {
param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type, NULL);
}
if (param) {
mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
} else {
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
}
len = wrappedKey->len;
session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism,
wrappingKey->objectID, symKey->objectID,
wrappedKey->data, &len);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
rv = SECSuccess;
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
/* can't wrap it? try hand wrapping it... */
do {
if (symKey->data.data == NULL) {
rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
break;
}
rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data,
wrappedKey);
} while (PR_FALSE);
} else {
wrappedKey->len = len;
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(newSymKey);
PK11_FreeSymKey(newWrappingKey);
if (param_save)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param_save, PR_TRUE);
return rv;
}
/*
* This Generates a new key based on a symetricKey
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_Derive(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, SECItem *param,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize)
{
return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation,
keySize, NULL, 0, PR_FALSE);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_DeriveWithFlags(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive,
SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags)
{
CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
unsigned int templateCount;
templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue);
return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation,
keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_DeriveWithFlagsPerm(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive,
SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm)
{
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
unsigned int templateCount = 0;
attrs = keyTemplate;
if (isPerm) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
attrs++;
}
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation,
keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive,
SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs,
PRBool isPerm)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = baseKey->slot;
PK11SymKey *symKey;
PK11SymKey *newBaseKey = NULL;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_ULONG valueLen = 0;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_RV crv;
#define MAX_ADD_ATTRS 4
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS + MAX_ADD_ATTRS];
#undef MAX_ADD_ATTRS
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
unsigned int templateCount;
if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
/* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
* Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
* it as a real attribute */
if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
/* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
* etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
}
/* first copy caller attributes in. */
for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) {
*attrs++ = *userAttr++;
}
/* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller
** didn't already supply them.
*/
if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS)) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass);
attrs++;
}
if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType);
attrs++;
}
if (keySize > 0 &&
!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN)) {
valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen);
attrs++;
}
if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY) &&
!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof cktrue);
attrs++;
}
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
/* move the key to a slot that can do the function */
if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, derive)) {
/* get a new base key & slot */
PK11SlotInfo *newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(derive, baseKey->cx);
if (newSlot == NULL)
return NULL;
newBaseKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, derive, CKA_DERIVE,
baseKey);
PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot);
if (newBaseKey == NULL)
return NULL;
baseKey = newBaseKey;
slot = baseKey->slot;
}
/* get our key Structure */
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, !isPerm, PR_TRUE, baseKey->cx);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
symKey->size = keySize;
mechanism.mechanism = derive;
if (param) {
mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
} else {
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
}
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive;
if (isPerm) {
session = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
} else {
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
session = symKey->session;
}
if (session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
if (!isPerm)
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
} else {
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(session, &mechanism,
baseKey->objectID, keyTemplate, templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
if (isPerm) {
PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, session);
} else {
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
}
}
if (newBaseKey)
PK11_FreeSymKey(newBaseKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return NULL;
}
return symKey;
}
/* Create a new key by concatenating base and data
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndData(PK11SymKey *base,
CK_BYTE *data, CK_ULONG dataLen, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
{
CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA mechParams;
SECItem param;
if (base == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
mechParams.pData = data;
mechParams.ulLen = dataLen;
param.data = (unsigned char *)&mechParams;
param.len = sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA);
return PK11_Derive(base, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA,
¶m, target, operation, 0);
}
/* Create a new key by concatenating base and key
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(PK11SymKey *base,
PK11SymKey *key, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_ULONG keySize)
{
SECItem param;
if ((base == NULL) || (key == NULL)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
param.data = (unsigned char *)&(key->objectID);
param.len = sizeof(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE);
return PK11_Derive(base, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY,
¶m, target, operation, keySize);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_ConcatSymKeys(PK11SymKey *left, PK11SymKey *right, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
{
PK11SymKey *out = NULL;
PK11SymKey *copyOfLeft = NULL;
PK11SymKey *copyOfRight = NULL;
if ((left == NULL) || (right == NULL)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
SECStatus rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY,
CKA_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, left, right,
©OfLeft, ©OfRight);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* error code already set */
return NULL;
}
out = pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(copyOfLeft ? copyOfLeft : left, copyOfRight ? copyOfRight : right, target, operation, 0);
PK11_FreeSymKey(copyOfLeft);
PK11_FreeSymKey(copyOfRight);
return out;
}
/* Create a new key whose value is the hash of tobehashed.
* type is the mechanism for the derived key.
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_HashKeyDerivation(PK11SymKey *toBeHashed,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_ULONG keySize)
{
return PK11_Derive(toBeHashed, hashMechanism, NULL, target, operation, keySize);
}
/* This function implements the ANSI X9.63 key derivation function
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_ANSIX963Derive(PK11SymKey *sharedSecret,
CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf, SECItem *sharedData,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
CK_ULONG keySize)
{
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism, mechanismArray[4];
CK_ULONG derivedKeySize, HashLen, counter, maxCounter, bufferLen;
CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen;
CK_BYTE *buffer = NULL;
PK11SymKey *toBeHashed, *hashOutput;
PK11SymKey *newSharedSecret = NULL;
PK11SymKey *oldIntermediateResult, *intermediateResult = NULL;
if (sharedSecret == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
switch (kdf) {
case CKD_SHA1_KDF:
HashLen = SHA1_LENGTH;
hashMechanism = CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION;
break;
case CKD_SHA224_KDF:
HashLen = SHA224_LENGTH;
hashMechanism = CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION;
break;
case CKD_SHA256_KDF:
HashLen = SHA256_LENGTH;
hashMechanism = CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION;
break;
case CKD_SHA384_KDF:
HashLen = SHA384_LENGTH;
hashMechanism = CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION;
break;
case CKD_SHA512_KDF:
HashLen = SHA512_LENGTH;
hashMechanism = CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION;
break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
derivedKeySize = keySize;
if (derivedKeySize == 0) {
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
derivedKeySize = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType);
if (derivedKeySize == 0) {
derivedKeySize = HashLen;
}
}
/* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be
* greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
* to a maximum value of 255. */
if (derivedKeySize > 254 * HashLen) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
maxCounter = derivedKeySize / HashLen;
if (derivedKeySize > maxCounter * HashLen)
maxCounter++;
if ((sharedData == NULL) || (sharedData->data == NULL))
SharedInfoLen = 0;
else
SharedInfoLen = sharedData->len;
bufferLen = SharedInfoLen + 4;
/* Populate buffer with Counter || sharedData
* where Counter is 0x00000001. */
buffer = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(bufferLen);
if (buffer == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return NULL;
}
buffer[0] = 0;
buffer[1] = 0;
buffer[2] = 0;
buffer[3] = 1;
if (SharedInfoLen > 0) {
PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[4], sharedData->data, SharedInfoLen);
}
/* Look for a slot that supports the mechanisms needed
* to implement the ANSI X9.63 KDF as well as the
* target mechanism.
*/
mechanismArray[0] = CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA;
mechanismArray[1] = hashMechanism;
mechanismArray[2] = CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY;
mechanismArray[3] = target;
newSharedSecret = pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(sharedSecret,
mechanismArray, 4, operation);
if (newSharedSecret != NULL) {
sharedSecret = newSharedSecret;
}
for (counter = 1; counter <= maxCounter; counter++) {
/* Concatenate shared_secret and buffer */
toBeHashed = pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndData(sharedSecret, buffer,
bufferLen, hashMechanism, operation);
if (toBeHashed == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
/* Hash value */
if (maxCounter == 1) {
/* In this case the length of the key to be derived is
* less than or equal to the length of the hash output.
* So, the output of the hash operation will be the
* dervied key. */
hashOutput = pk11_HashKeyDerivation(toBeHashed, hashMechanism,
target, operation, keySize);
} else {
/* In this case, the output of the hash operation will be
* concatenated with other data to create the derived key. */
hashOutput = pk11_HashKeyDerivation(toBeHashed, hashMechanism,
CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY, operation, 0);
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(toBeHashed);
if (hashOutput == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
/* Append result to intermediate result, if necessary */
oldIntermediateResult = intermediateResult;
if (oldIntermediateResult == NULL) {
intermediateResult = hashOutput;
} else {
if (counter == maxCounter) {
/* This is the final concatenation, and so the output
* will be the derived key. */
intermediateResult =
pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(oldIntermediateResult,
hashOutput, target, operation, keySize);
} else {
/* The output of this concatenation will be concatenated
* with other data to create the derived key. */
intermediateResult =
pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(oldIntermediateResult,
hashOutput, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY,
operation, 0);
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(hashOutput);
PK11_FreeSymKey(oldIntermediateResult);
if (intermediateResult == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
}
/* Increment counter (assumes maxCounter < 255) */
buffer[3]++;
}
PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufferLen);
if (newSharedSecret != NULL)
PK11_FreeSymKey(newSharedSecret);
return intermediateResult;
loser:
PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufferLen);
if (newSharedSecret != NULL)
PK11_FreeSymKey(newSharedSecret);
if (intermediateResult != NULL)
PK11_FreeSymKey(intermediateResult);
return NULL;
}
/*
* This regenerate a public key from a private key. This function is currently
* NSS private. If we want to make it public, we need to add and optional
* template or at least flags (a.la. PK11_DeriveWithFlags).
*/
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
PK11_DerivePubKeyFromPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_RV crv;
mechanism.mechanism = CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV;
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(slot->session, &mechanism,
privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL, 0,
&objectID);
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
return objectID;
}
/*
* This Generates a wrapping key based on a privateKey, publicKey, and two
* random numbers. For Mail usage RandomB should be NULL. In the Sender's
* case RandomA is generate, otherwise it is passed.
*/
PK11SymKey *
PK11_PubDerive(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, void *wincx)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
PK11SymKey *symKey;
CK_RV crv;
/* get our key Structure */
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, wincx);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
* Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
* it as a real attribute */
if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
/* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
* etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
}
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive;
switch (privKey->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
case rsaPssKey:
case rsaOaepKey:
case kyberKey:
case nullKey:
case edKey:
case ecMontKey:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
break;
case dsaKey:
case keaKey:
case fortezzaKey: {
static unsigned char rb_email[128] = { 0 };
CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS param;
param.isSender = (CK_BBOOL)isSender;
param.ulRandomLen = randomA->len;
param.pRandomA = randomA->data;
param.pRandomB = rb_email;
param.pRandomB[127] = 1;
if (randomB)
param.pRandomB = randomB->data;
if (pubKey->keyType == fortezzaKey) {
param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len;
param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data;
} else {
/* assert type == keaKey */
/* XXX change to match key key types */
param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len;
param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data;
}
mechanism.mechanism = derive;
mechanism.pParameter = ¶m;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param);
/* get a new symKey structure */
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism,
privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL, 0,
&symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
if (crv == CKR_OK)
return symKey;
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
} break;
case dhKey: {
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_ULONG key_size = 0;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4];
int templateCount;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
if (pubKey->keyType != dhKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
break;
}
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size));
attrs++;
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
key_size = keySize;
symKey->size = keySize;
if (key_size == 0)
templateCount--;
mechanism.mechanism = derive;
/* we can undefine these when we define diffie-helman keys */
mechanism.pParameter = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len;
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism,
privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
if (crv == CKR_OK)
return symKey;
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
} break;
case ecKey: {
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_ULONG key_size = 0;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4];
int templateCount;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams = NULL;
if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
break;
}
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size));
attrs++;
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
key_size = keySize;
if (key_size == 0) {
if ((key_size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType))) {
templateCount--;
} else {
/* sigh, some tokens can't figure this out and require
* CKA_VALUE_LEN to be set */
key_size = SHA1_LENGTH;
}
}
symKey->size = key_size;
mechParams = PORT_ZNew(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
mechParams->kdf = CKD_SHA1_KDF;
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0;
mechParams->pSharedData = NULL;
mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data;
mechanism.mechanism = derive;
mechanism.pParameter = mechParams;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session,
&mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
/* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed,
* try this again with and encoded public key */
if (crv != CKR_OK && pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey) != ECPoint_XOnly) {
SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
&pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
if (pubValue == NULL) {
PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
break;
}
mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len;
mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data;
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session,
&mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
}
PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
if (crv == CKR_OK)
return symKey;
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
}
}
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return NULL;
}
/* Test for curves that are known to use a special encoding.
* Extend this function when additional curves are added. */
static ECPointEncoding
pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
SECItem oid;
SECStatus rv;
PORTCheapArenaPool tmpArena;
ECPointEncoding encoding = ECPoint_Undefined;
PORT_InitCheapArena(&tmpArena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
/* decode the OID tag */
rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(&tmpArena.arena, &oid,
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate),
&pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
SECOidTag tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid);
switch (tag) {
case SEC_OID_X25519:
case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
encoding = ECPoint_XOnly;
break;
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
default:
/* unknown curve, default to uncompressed */
encoding = ECPoint_Uncompressed;
}
}
PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&tmpArena);
return encoding;
}
/* Returns the size of the public key, or 0 if there
* is an error. */
static CK_ULONG
pk11_ECPubKeySize(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
SECItem *publicValue = &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue;
ECPointEncoding encoding = pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey);
if (encoding == ECPoint_XOnly) {
return publicValue->len;
}
if (encoding == ECPoint_Uncompressed) {
/* key encoded in uncompressed form */
return ((publicValue->len - 1) / 2);
}
/* key encoding not recognized */
return 0;
}
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_PubDeriveECKeyWithKDF(
SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
CK_ULONG kdf, SECItem *sharedData, void *wincx)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
PK11SymKey *symKey;
PK11SymKey *SharedSecret;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_RV crv;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_ULONG key_size = 0;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4];
int templateCount;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams = NULL;
if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey && pubKey->keyType != ecMontKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
return NULL;
}
if ((kdf != CKD_NULL) && (kdf != CKD_SHA1_KDF) &&
(kdf != CKD_SHA224_KDF) && (kdf != CKD_SHA256_KDF) &&
(kdf != CKD_SHA384_KDF) && (kdf != CKD_SHA512_KDF)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
return NULL;
}
/* get our key Structure */
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, wincx);
if (symKey == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
* Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
* it as a real attribute */
if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
/* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
* etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
}
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size));
attrs++;
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
key_size = keySize;
if (key_size == 0) {
if ((key_size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType))) {
templateCount--;
} else {
/* sigh, some tokens can't figure this out and require
* CKA_VALUE_LEN to be set */
switch (kdf) {
case CKD_NULL:
key_size = pk11_ECPubKeySize(pubKey);
if (key_size == 0) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return NULL;
}
break;
case CKD_SHA1_KDF:
key_size = SHA1_LENGTH;
break;
case CKD_SHA224_KDF:
key_size = SHA224_LENGTH;
break;
case CKD_SHA256_KDF:
key_size = SHA256_LENGTH;
break;
case CKD_SHA384_KDF:
key_size = SHA384_LENGTH;
break;
case CKD_SHA512_KDF:
key_size = SHA512_LENGTH;
break;
default:
PORT_AssertNotReached("Invalid CKD");
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return NULL;
}
}
}
symKey->size = key_size;
mechParams = PORT_ZNew(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
if (!mechParams) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return NULL;
}
mechParams->kdf = kdf;
if (sharedData == NULL) {
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0;
mechParams->pSharedData = NULL;
} else {
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = sharedData->len;
mechParams->pSharedData = sharedData->data;
}
mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data;
mechanism.mechanism = derive;
mechanism.pParameter = mechParams;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism,
privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
/* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed,
* try this again with an encoded public key */
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
/* For curves that only use X as public value and no encoding we don't
* have to try again. (Currently only Curve25519) */
if (pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey) == ECPoint_XOnly) {
goto loser;
}
SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
&pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
if (pubValue == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len;
mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data;
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session,
&mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
if ((crv != CKR_OK) && (kdf != CKD_NULL)) {
/* Some PKCS #11 libraries cannot perform the key derivation
* function. So, try calling C_DeriveKey with CKD_NULL and then
* performing the KDF separately.
*/
CK_ULONG derivedKeySize = key_size;
keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
key_size = pk11_ECPubKeySize(pubKey);
if (key_size == 0) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
goto loser;
}
SharedSecret = symKey;
SharedSecret->size = key_size;
mechParams->kdf = CKD_NULL;
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0;
mechParams->pSharedData = NULL;
mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data;
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(SharedSecret->session,
&mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &SharedSecret->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
/* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed,
* try this one final time with an encoded public key */
mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len;
mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data;
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(SharedSecret->session,
&mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &SharedSecret->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
}
/* Perform KDF. */
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
symKey = pk11_ANSIX963Derive(SharedSecret, kdf,
sharedData, target, operation,
derivedKeySize);
PK11_FreeSymKey(SharedSecret);
if (symKey == NULL) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
return NULL;
}
}
}
SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
}
loser:
PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
symKey = NULL;
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
}
return symKey;
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
CK_ULONG kdf, SECItem *sharedData, void *wincx)
{
switch (privKey->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
case nullKey:
case dsaKey:
case keaKey:
case fortezzaKey:
case dhKey:
return PK11_PubDerive(privKey, pubKey, isSender, randomA, randomB,
derive, target, operation, keySize, wincx);
case ecKey:
case ecMontKey:
return pk11_PubDeriveECKeyWithKDF(privKey, pubKey, isSender,
randomA, randomB, derive, target,
operation, keySize,
kdf, sharedData, wincx);
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
break;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* this little function uses the Decrypt function to unwrap a key, just in
* case we are having problem with unwrap. NOTE: The key size may
* not be preserved properly for some algorithms!
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_HandUnwrap(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey,
CK_MECHANISM *mech, SECItem *inKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate, unsigned int templateCount,
int key_size, void *wincx, CK_RV *crvp, PRBool isPerm)
{
CK_ULONG len;
SECItem outKey;
PK11SymKey *symKey;
CK_RV crv;
PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
/* remove any VALUE_LEN parameters */
if (keyTemplate[templateCount - 1].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
templateCount--;
}
/* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far,
* we've gone above and beyond anyway... */
outKey.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(inKey->len);
if (outKey.data == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
if (crvp)
*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
return NULL;
}
len = inKey->len;
/* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DecryptInit(session, mech, wrappingKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
PORT_Free(outKey.data);
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
if (crvp)
*crvp = crv;
return NULL;
}
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Decrypt(session, inKey->data, inKey->len,
outKey.data, &len);
if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(outKey.data);
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
if (crvp)
*crvp = crv;
return NULL;
}
outKey.len = (key_size == 0) ? len : key_size;
outKey.type = siBuffer;
if (PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, target)) {
symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
isPerm, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &outKey, wincx);
} else {
slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target, wincx);
if (slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
PORT_Free(outKey.data);
if (crvp)
*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
isPerm, keyTemplate,
templateCount, &outKey, wincx);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
PORT_Free(outKey.data);
if (crvp)
*crvp = symKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
return symKey;
}
/*
* The wrap/unwrap function is pretty much the same for private and
* public keys. It's just getting the Object ID and slot right. This is
* the combined unwrap function.
*/
static PK11SymKey *
pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
void *wincx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs, PRBool isPerm)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey;
SECItem *param_free = NULL;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_ULONG valueLen = 0;
CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
CK_RV crv;
CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info;
#define MAX_ADD_ATTRS 4
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS + MAX_ADD_ATTRS];
#undef MAX_ADD_ATTRS
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
unsigned int templateCount;
if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
/* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
* Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
* it as a real attribute */
if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
/* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
* etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
}
/* first copy caller attributes in. */
for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) {
*attrs++ = *userAttr++;
}
/* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller
** didn't already supply them.
*/
if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS)) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass);
attrs++;
}
if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType);
attrs++;
}
if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY) &&
!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
attrs++;
}
/*
* must be last in case we need to use this template to import the key
*/
if (keySize > 0 &&
!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN)) {
valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen);
attrs++;
}
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
/* find out if we can do wrap directly. Because the RSA case if *very*
* common, cache the results for it. */
if ((wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS) && (slot->hasRSAInfo)) {
mechanism_info.flags = slot->RSAInfoFlags;
} else {
if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID, wrapType,
&mechanism_info);
if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
mechanism_info.flags = 0;
}
if (wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
slot->RSAInfoFlags = mechanism_info.flags;
slot->hasRSAInfo = PR_TRUE;
}
}
/* initialize the mechanism structure */
mechanism.mechanism = wrapType;
/* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
if (param == NULL)
param = param_free = PK11_ParamFromIV(wrapType, NULL);
if (param) {
mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
} else {
mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
}
if ((mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT) && !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, target)) {
symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey,
target, keyTemplate, templateCount, keySize,
wincx, &crv, isPerm);
if (symKey) {
if (param_free)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
return symKey;
}
/*
* if the RSA OP simply failed, don't try to unwrap again
* with this module.
*/
if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR) {
if (param_free)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
/* fall through, maybe they incorrectly set CKF_DECRYPT */
}
/* get our key Structure */
symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, !isPerm, PR_TRUE, wincx);
if (symKey == NULL) {
if (param_free)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
symKey->size = keySize;
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginUnwrap;
if (isPerm) {
rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
} else {
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
rwsession = symKey->session;
}
PORT_Assert(rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
else
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_UnwrapKey(rwsession, &mechanism, wrappingKey,
wrappedKey->data, wrappedKey->len,
keyTemplate, templateCount,
&symKey->objectID);
if (isPerm) {
if (rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);
} else {
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
}
if (param_free)
SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
symKey = NULL;
if (crv != CKR_DEVICE_ERROR) {
/* try hand Unwrapping */
symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey,
target, keyTemplate, templateCount,
keySize, wincx, NULL, isPerm);
}
}
return symKey;
}
/* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_UnwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType,
SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize)
{
return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID,
wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
wrappingKey->cx, NULL, 0, PR_FALSE);
}
/* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType,
SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags)
{
CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
unsigned int templateCount;
templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue);
return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID,
wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlagsPerm(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType,
SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm)
{
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
unsigned int templateCount;
attrs = keyTemplate;
if (isPerm) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
attrs++;
}
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID,
wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm);
}
/* unwrap a symmetric key with a private key. Only supports CKM_RSA_PKCS. */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *wrappedKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize)
{
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType);
return PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithMechanism(wrappingKey, wrapType, NULL,
wrappedKey, target, operation,
keySize);
}
/* unwrap a symmetric key with a private key with the given parameters. */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithMechanism(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey,
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, SECItem *param,
SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize)
{
PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot;
if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)) {
PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx);
}
return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, mechType, param,
wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
wrappingKey->wincx, NULL, 0, PR_FALSE);
}
/* unwrap a symetric key with a private key. */
PK11SymKey *
PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey,
SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags)
{
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType);
CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
unsigned int templateCount;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot;
templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue);
if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)) {
PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx);
}
return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID,
wrapType, NULL, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
wrappingKey->wincx, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithFlagsPerm(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey,
SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm)
{
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType);
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
unsigned int templateCount;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot;
attrs = keyTemplate;
if (isPerm) {
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
attrs++;
}
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)) {
PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx);
}
return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID,
wrapType, NULL, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
wrappingKey->wincx, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm);
}
PK11SymKey *
PK11_CopySymKeyForSigning(PK11SymKey *originalKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
{
CK_RV crv;
CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate;
CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = originalKey->slot;
/* first just try to set this key up for signing */
PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_SIGN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(originalKey);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(originalKey->session,
originalKey->objectID, &setTemplate, 1);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(originalKey);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(originalKey);
}
/* nope, doesn't like it, use the pk11 copy object command */
return pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, mech, CKA_SIGN, originalKey);
}
void
PK11_SetFortezzaHack(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
symKey->origin = PK11_OriginFortezzaHack;
}
/*
* This is required to allow FORTEZZA_NULL and FORTEZZA_RC4
* working. This function simply gets a valid IV for the keys.
*/
SECStatus
PK11_GenerateFortezzaIV(PK11SymKey *symKey, unsigned char *iv, int len)
{
CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
CK_ULONG count = 0;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
mech_info.mechanism = CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64;
mech_info.pParameter = iv;
mech_info.ulParameterLen = len;
/* generate the IV for fortezza */
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_EncryptInit(symKey->slot->session, &mech_info, symKey->objectID);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(symKey->slot->session, NULL, &count);
rv = SECSuccess;
}
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
return rv;
}
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(PK11SymKey *symKey)
{
return symKey->objectID;
}
static CK_ULONG
pk11_KyberCiphertextLength(SECKEYKyberPublicKey *pubKey)
{
switch (pubKey->params) {
case params_kyber768_round3:
case params_kyber768_round3_test_mode:
case params_ml_kem768:
case params_ml_kem768_test_mode:
return KYBER768_CIPHERTEXT_BYTES;
default:
// unreachable
return 0;
}
}
static CK_ULONG
pk11_KEMCiphertextLength(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
{
switch (pubKey->keyType) {
case kyberKey:
return pk11_KyberCiphertextLength(&pubKey->u.kyber);
default:
// unreachable
PORT_Assert(0);
return 0;
}
}
SECStatus
PK11_Encapsulate(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, CK_FLAGS opFlags, PK11SymKey **outKey, SECItem **outCiphertext)
{
PORT_Assert(pubKey);
PORT_Assert(outKey);
PORT_Assert(outCiphertext);
PK11SlotInfo *slot = pubKey->pkcs11Slot;
PK11SymKey *sharedSecret = NULL;
SECItem *ciphertext = NULL;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
unsigned int templateCount;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_INTERFACE_PTR KEMInterface = NULL;
CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR KEMInterfaceName = (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR) "Vendor NSS KEM Interface";
CK_VERSION KEMInterfaceVersion = { 1, 0 };
CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *KEMInterfaceFunctions = NULL;
CK_RV crv;
*outKey = NULL;
*outCiphertext = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kemType;
CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE kemParameterSet = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, pubKey->pkcs11ID, CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET);
switch (kemParameterSet) {
case CKP_NSS_KYBER_768_ROUND3:
kemType = CKM_NSS_KYBER;
break;
case CKP_NSS_ML_KEM_768:
kemType = CKM_NSS_ML_KEM;
break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
CK_MECHANISM mech = { kemType, &kemParameterSet, sizeof(kemParameterSet) };
sharedSecret = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, NULL);
if (sharedSecret == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
sharedSecret->origin = PK11_OriginGenerated;
attrs = keyTemplate;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse);
attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue);
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetInterface(KEMInterfaceName, &KEMInterfaceVersion, &KEMInterface, 0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto error;
}
KEMInterfaceFunctions = (CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *)(KEMInterface->pFunctionList);
CK_ULONG ciphertextLen = pk11_KEMCiphertextLength(pubKey);
ciphertext = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, ciphertextLen);
if (ciphertext == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
goto error;
}
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret);
crv = KEMInterfaceFunctions->C_Encapsulate(sharedSecret->session,
&mech,
pubKey->pkcs11ID,
keyTemplate,
templateCount,
&sharedSecret->objectID,
ciphertext->data,
&ciphertextLen);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto error;
}
PORT_Assert(ciphertextLen == ciphertext->len);
*outKey = sharedSecret;
*outCiphertext = ciphertext;
return SECSuccess;
error:
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
PK11_FreeSymKey(sharedSecret);
SECITEM_FreeItem(ciphertext, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
SECStatus
PK11_Decapsulate(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, const SECItem *ciphertext, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, CK_FLAGS opFlags, PK11SymKey **outKey)
{
PORT_Assert(privKey);
PORT_Assert(ciphertext);
PORT_Assert(outKey);
PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
PK11SymKey *sharedSecret;
CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
unsigned int templateCount;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_INTERFACE_PTR KEMInterface = NULL;
CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR KEMInterfaceName = (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR) "Vendor NSS KEM Interface";
CK_VERSION KEMInterfaceVersion = { 1, 0 };
CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *KEMInterfaceFunctions = NULL;
CK_RV crv;
*outKey = NULL;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE kemType;
CK_NSS_KEM_PARAMETER_SET_TYPE kemParameterSet = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(slot, privKey->pkcs11ID, CKA_NSS_PARAMETER_SET);
switch (kemParameterSet) {
case CKP_NSS_KYBER_768_ROUND3:
kemType = CKM_NSS_KYBER;
break;
case CKP_NSS_ML_KEM_768:
kemType = CKM_NSS_ML_KEM;
break;
default:
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
CK_MECHANISM mech = { kemType, &kemParameterSet, sizeof(kemParameterSet) };
sharedSecret = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, NULL);
if (sharedSecret == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
sharedSecret->origin = PK11_OriginUnwrap;
attrs = keyTemplate;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
attrs++;
attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse);
attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue);
templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetInterface(KEMInterfaceName, &KEMInterfaceVersion, &KEMInterface, 0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
goto error;
}
KEMInterfaceFunctions = (CK_NSS_KEM_FUNCTIONS *)(KEMInterface->pFunctionList);
pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(sharedSecret);
crv = KEMInterfaceFunctions->C_Decapsulate(sharedSecret->session,
&mech,
privKey->pkcs11ID,
ciphertext->data,
ciphertext->len,
keyTemplate,
templateCount,
&sharedSecret->objectID);
pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(sharedSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto error;
}
*outKey = sharedSecret;
return SECSuccess;
error:
PK11_FreeSymKey(sharedSecret);
return SECFailure;
}