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/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
/* A namespace class for static content security utilities. */
#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Components.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
#include "nsIMultiPartChannel.h"
#include "nsIURI.h"
#include "nsITransfer.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
#if defined(XP_WIN)
# include "mozilla/WinHeaderOnlyUtils.h"
# include "WinUtils.h"
# include <wininet.h>
#endif
#include "FramingChecker.h"
#include "js/Array.h" // JS::GetArrayLength
#include "js/ContextOptions.h"
#include "js/PropertyAndElement.h" // JS_GetElement
#include "js/RegExp.h"
#include "js/RegExpFlags.h" // JS::RegExpFlags
#include "js/friend/ErrorMessages.h" // JSMSG_UNSAFE_FILENAME
#include "mozilla/ExtensionPolicyService.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h"
#include "mozilla/glean/GleanMetrics.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
#include "LoadInfo.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_extensions.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
using namespace mozilla;
using namespace mozilla::dom;
extern mozilla::LazyLogModule sCSMLog;
extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksChecked;
extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksPresent;
extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksChecked;
extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksPresent;
// Helper function for IsConsideredSameOriginForUIR which makes
// Principals of scheme 'http' return Principals of scheme 'https'.
static already_AddRefed<nsIPrincipal> MakeHTTPPrincipalHTTPS(
nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = aPrincipal;
// if the principal is not http, then it can also not be upgraded
// to https.
if (!principal->SchemeIs("http")) {
return principal.forget();
}
nsAutoCString spec;
aPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(spec);
// replace http with https
spec.ReplaceLiteral(0, 4, "https");
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI), spec);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return nullptr;
}
mozilla::OriginAttributes OA =
BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->OriginAttributesRef();
principal = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(newURI, OA);
return principal.forget();
}
/* static */
bool nsContentSecurityUtils::IsConsideredSameOriginForUIR(
nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal, nsIPrincipal* aResultPrincipal) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aTriggeringPrincipal);
MOZ_ASSERT(aResultPrincipal);
// we only have to make sure that the following truth table holds:
// aTriggeringPrincipal | aResultPrincipal | Result
// ----------------------------------------------------------------
// fast path if both principals are same-origin
if (aTriggeringPrincipal->Equals(aResultPrincipal)) {
return true;
}
// in case a principal uses a scheme of 'http' then we just upgrade to
// 'https' and use the principal equals comparison operator to check
// for same-origin.
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> compareTriggeringPrincipal =
MakeHTTPPrincipalHTTPS(aTriggeringPrincipal);
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> compareResultPrincipal =
MakeHTTPPrincipalHTTPS(aResultPrincipal);
return compareTriggeringPrincipal->Equals(compareResultPrincipal);
}
/*
* Performs a Regular Expression match, optionally returning the results.
* This function is not safe to use OMT.
*
* @param aPattern The regex pattern
* @param aString The string to compare against
* @param aOnlyMatch Whether we want match results or only a true/false for
* the match
* @param aMatchResult Out param for whether or not the pattern matched
* @param aRegexResults Out param for the matches of the regex, if requested
* @returns nsresult indicating correct function operation or error
*/
nsresult RegexEval(const nsAString& aPattern, const nsAString& aString,
bool aOnlyMatch, bool& aMatchResult,
nsTArray<nsString>* aRegexResults = nullptr) {
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
aMatchResult = false;
mozilla::dom::AutoJSAPI jsapi;
jsapi.Init();
JSContext* cx = jsapi.cx();
mozilla::AutoDisableJSInterruptCallback disabler(cx);
// We can use the junk scope here, because we're just using it for regexp
// evaluation, not actual script execution, and we disable statics so that the
// evaluation does not interact with the execution global.
JSAutoRealm ar(cx, xpc::PrivilegedJunkScope());
JS::Rooted<JSObject*> regexp(
cx, JS::NewUCRegExpObject(cx, aPattern.BeginReading(), aPattern.Length(),
JS::RegExpFlag::Unicode));
if (!regexp) {
return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
}
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> regexResult(cx, JS::NullValue());
size_t index = 0;
if (!JS::ExecuteRegExpNoStatics(cx, regexp, aString.BeginReading(),
aString.Length(), &index, aOnlyMatch,
®exResult)) {
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
if (regexResult.isNull()) {
// On no match, ExecuteRegExpNoStatics returns Null
return NS_OK;
}
if (aOnlyMatch) {
// On match, with aOnlyMatch = true, ExecuteRegExpNoStatics returns boolean
// true.
MOZ_ASSERT(regexResult.isBoolean() && regexResult.toBoolean());
aMatchResult = true;
return NS_OK;
}
if (aRegexResults == nullptr) {
return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
}
// Now we know we have a result, and we need to extract it so we can read it.
uint32_t length;
JS::Rooted<JSObject*> regexResultObj(cx, ®exResult.toObject());
if (!JS::GetArrayLength(cx, regexResultObj, &length)) {
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("Regex Matched %i strings", length));
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
JS::Rooted<JS::Value> element(cx);
if (!JS_GetElement(cx, regexResultObj, i, &element)) {
return NS_ERROR_NO_CONTENT;
}
nsAutoJSString value;
if (!value.init(cx, element)) {
return NS_ERROR_NO_CONTENT;
}
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
("Regex Matching: %i: %s", i, NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(value).get()));
aRegexResults->AppendElement(value);
}
aMatchResult = true;
return NS_OK;
}
/*
* MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF has a sPrintfCrashReasonSize-sized buffer. We need
* to make sure we don't exceed it. These functions perform this check and
* munge things for us.
*
*/
/*
* Destructively truncates a string to fit within the limit
*/
char* nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(const char* str) {
return nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(strdup(str));
}
char* nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(char* str) {
auto str_len = strlen(str);
if (str_len > sPrintfCrashReasonSize) {
str[sPrintfCrashReasonSize - 1] = '\0';
str_len = strlen(str);
}
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sPrintfCrashReasonSize > str_len);
return str;
}
/*
* Destructively truncates two strings to fit within the limit.
* format_string is a format string containing two %s entries
* The second string will be truncated to the _last_ 25 characters
* The first string will be truncated to the remaining limit.
*/
nsCString nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
const char* part1, const char* part2, const char* format_string) {
return SmartFormatCrashString(strdup(part1), strdup(part2), format_string);
}
nsCString nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
char* part1, char* part2, const char* format_string) {
auto part1_len = strlen(part1);
auto part2_len = strlen(part2);
auto constant_len = strlen(format_string) - 4;
if (part1_len + part2_len + constant_len > sPrintfCrashReasonSize) {
if (part2_len > 25) {
part2 += (part2_len - 25);
}
part2_len = strlen(part2);
part1[sPrintfCrashReasonSize - (constant_len + part2_len + 1)] = '\0';
part1_len = strlen(part1);
}
MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sPrintfCrashReasonSize >
constant_len + part1_len + part2_len);
auto parts = nsPrintfCString(format_string, part1, part2);
return std::move(parts);
}
/*
* Telemetry Events extra data only supports 80 characters, so we optimize the
* filename to be smaller and collect more data.
*/
nsCString OptimizeFileName(const nsAString& aFileName) {
nsCString optimizedName;
CopyUTF16toUTF8(aFileName, optimizedName);
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
("Optimizing FileName: %s", optimizedName.get()));
optimizedName.ReplaceSubstring(".xpi!"_ns, "!"_ns);
optimizedName.ReplaceSubstring("shield.mozilla.org!"_ns, "s!"_ns);
optimizedName.ReplaceSubstring("mozilla.org!"_ns, "m!"_ns);
if (optimizedName.Length() > 80) {
optimizedName.Truncate(80);
}
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
("Optimized FileName: %s", optimizedName.get()));
return optimizedName;
}
/*
* FilenameToFilenameType takes a fileName and returns a Pair of strings.
* The First entry is a string indicating the type of fileName
* The Second entry is a Maybe<string> that can contain additional details to
* report.
*
* The reason we use strings (instead of an int/enum) is because the Telemetry
* Events API only accepts strings.
*
* Function is a static member of the class to enable gtests.
*/
/* static */
FilenameTypeAndDetails nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(
const nsACString& fileName, bool collectAdditionalExtensionData) {
// These are strings because the Telemetry Events API only accepts strings
static constexpr auto kChromeURI = "chromeuri"_ns;
static constexpr auto kResourceURI = "resourceuri"_ns;
static constexpr auto kBlobUri = "bloburi"_ns;
static constexpr auto kDataUri = "dataurl"_ns;
static constexpr auto kAboutUri = "abouturi"_ns;
static constexpr auto kDataUriWebExtCStyle =
"dataurl-extension-contentstyle"_ns;
static constexpr auto kSingleString = "singlestring"_ns;
static constexpr auto kMozillaExtensionFile = "mozillaextension_file"_ns;
static constexpr auto kOtherExtensionFile = "otherextension_file"_ns;
static constexpr auto kExtensionURI = "extension_uri"_ns;
static constexpr auto kSuspectedUserChromeJS = "suspectedUserChromeJS"_ns;
#if defined(XP_WIN)
static constexpr auto kSanitizedWindowsURL = "sanitizedWindowsURL"_ns;
static constexpr auto kSanitizedWindowsPath = "sanitizedWindowsPath"_ns;
#endif
static constexpr auto kOther = "other"_ns;
static constexpr auto kOtherWorker = "other-on-worker"_ns;
static constexpr auto kRegexFailure = "regexfailure"_ns;
static constexpr auto kUCJSRegex = u"(.+).uc.js\\?*[0-9]*$"_ns;
static constexpr auto kExtensionRegex = u"extensions/(.+)@(.+)!(.+)$"_ns;
static constexpr auto kSingleFileRegex = u"^[a-zA-Z0-9.?]+$"_ns;
if (fileName.IsEmpty()) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kOther, Nothing());
}
// resource:// and chrome://
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "chrome://"_ns)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kChromeURI, Some(nsCString(fileName)));
}
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "resource://"_ns)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kResourceURI, Some(nsCString(fileName)));
}
// blob: and data:
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "blob:"_ns)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kBlobUri, Nothing());
}
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "data:text/css;extension=style;"_ns)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kDataUriWebExtCStyle, Nothing());
}
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "data:"_ns)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kDataUri, Nothing());
}
// Can't do regex matching off-main-thread
if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 fileNameA(fileName);
// Extension as loaded via a file://
bool regexMatch;
nsTArray<nsString> regexResults;
nsresult rv =
RegexEval(kExtensionRegex, fileNameA,
/* aOnlyMatch = */ false, regexMatch, ®exResults);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kRegexFailure, Nothing());
}
if (regexMatch) {
nsCString type = StringEndsWith(regexResults[2], u"mozilla.org.xpi"_ns)
? kMozillaExtensionFile
: kOtherExtensionFile;
const auto& extensionNameAndPath =
Substring(regexResults[0], std::size("extensions/") - 1);
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(
type, Some(OptimizeFileName(extensionNameAndPath)));
}
// Single File
rv = RegexEval(kSingleFileRegex, fileNameA, /* aOnlyMatch = */ true,
regexMatch);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kRegexFailure, Nothing());
}
if (regexMatch) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kSingleString, Some(nsCString(fileName)));
}
// Suspected userChromeJS script
rv = RegexEval(kUCJSRegex, fileNameA, /* aOnlyMatch = */ true, regexMatch);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kRegexFailure, Nothing());
}
if (regexMatch) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kSuspectedUserChromeJS, Nothing());
}
}
// Something loaded via an about:// URI.
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "about:"_ns)) {
// Remove any querystrings and such
long int desired_length = fileName.Length();
long int possible_new_length = 0;
possible_new_length = fileName.FindChar('?');
if (possible_new_length != -1 && possible_new_length < desired_length) {
desired_length = possible_new_length;
}
possible_new_length = fileName.FindChar('#');
if (possible_new_length != -1 && possible_new_length < desired_length) {
desired_length = possible_new_length;
}
auto subFileName = Substring(fileName, 0, desired_length);
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kAboutUri, Some(nsCString(subFileName)));
}
// Something loaded via a moz-extension:// URI.
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, "moz-extension://"_ns)) {
if (!collectAdditionalExtensionData) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kExtensionURI, Nothing());
}
nsAutoCString sanitizedPathAndScheme;
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append("moz-extension://["_ns);
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), fileName);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// Return after adding ://[ so we know we failed here.
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kExtensionURI,
Some(sanitizedPathAndScheme));
}
mozilla::extensions::URLInfo url(uri);
if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
// EPS is only usable on main thread
auto* policy =
ExtensionPolicyService::GetSingleton().GetByHost(url.Host());
if (policy) {
nsString addOnId;
policy->GetId(addOnId);
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(addOnId));
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(": "_ns);
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy->Name()));
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append("]"_ns);
if (policy->IsPrivileged()) {
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append("P=1"_ns);
} else {
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append("P=0"_ns);
}
} else {
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append("failed finding addon by host]"_ns);
}
} else {
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append("can't get addon off main thread]"_ns);
}
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(url.FilePath());
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kExtensionURI, Some(sanitizedPathAndScheme));
}
#if defined(XP_WIN)
auto flags = mozilla::widget::WinUtils::PathTransformFlags::Default |
mozilla::widget::WinUtils::PathTransformFlags::RequireFilePath;
const NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 fileNameA(fileName);
nsAutoString strSanitizedPath(fileNameA);
if (widget::WinUtils::PreparePathForTelemetry(strSanitizedPath, flags)) {
DWORD cchDecodedUrl = INTERNET_MAX_URL_LENGTH;
WCHAR szOut[INTERNET_MAX_URL_LENGTH];
HRESULT hr;
SAFECALL_URLMON_FUNC(CoInternetParseUrl, fileNameA.get(), PARSE_SCHEMA, 0,
szOut, INTERNET_MAX_URL_LENGTH, &cchDecodedUrl, 0);
if (hr == S_OK && cchDecodedUrl) {
nsAutoString sanitizedPathAndScheme;
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(szOut);
if (sanitizedPathAndScheme == u"file"_ns) {
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"://.../"_ns);
sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(strSanitizedPath);
}
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(
kSanitizedWindowsURL,
Some(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(sanitizedPathAndScheme)));
} else {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(
kSanitizedWindowsPath, Some(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(strSanitizedPath)));
}
}
#endif
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kOtherWorker, Nothing());
}
return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kOther, Nothing());
}
#if defined(EARLY_BETA_OR_EARLIER)
// Crash String must be safe from a telemetry point of view.
// This will be ensured when this function is used.
void PossiblyCrash(const char* aPrefSuffix, const char* aUnsafeCrashString,
const nsCString& aSafeCrashString) {
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(!XRE_IsParentProcess())) {
// We only crash in the parent (unfortunately) because it's
// the only place we can be sure that our only-crash-once
// pref-writing works.
return;
}
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
// Setting a pref off the main thread causes ContentParent to observe the
// pref set, resulting in a Release Assertion when it tries to update the
// child off main thread. So don't do any of this off main thread. (Which
// is a bit of a blind spot for this purpose...)
return;
}
nsCString previous_crashes("security.crash_tracking.");
previous_crashes.Append(aPrefSuffix);
previous_crashes.Append(".prevCrashes");
nsCString max_crashes("security.crash_tracking.");
max_crashes.Append(aPrefSuffix);
max_crashes.Append(".maxCrashes");
int32_t numberOfPreviousCrashes = 0;
numberOfPreviousCrashes = Preferences::GetInt(previous_crashes.get(), 0);
int32_t maxAllowableCrashes = 0;
maxAllowableCrashes = Preferences::GetInt(max_crashes.get(), 0);
if (numberOfPreviousCrashes >= maxAllowableCrashes) {
return;
}
nsresult rv =
Preferences::SetInt(previous_crashes.get(), ++numberOfPreviousCrashes);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefsCom = Preferences::GetService();
Preferences* prefs = static_cast<Preferences*>(prefsCom.get());
if (!prefs->AllowOffMainThreadSave()) {
// Do not crash if we can't save prefs off the main thread
return;
}
rv = prefs->SavePrefFileBlocking();
if (!NS_FAILED(rv)) {
// We can only use this in local builds where we don't send stuff up to the
// crash reporter because it has user private data.
// MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s",
// nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(aUnsafeCrashString));
MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF(
"%s",
nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(aSafeCrashString.get()));
}
}
#endif
class EvalUsageNotificationRunnable final : public Runnable {
public:
EvalUsageNotificationRunnable(bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
const nsACString& aFileName, uint64_t aWindowID,
uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber)
: mozilla::Runnable("EvalUsageNotificationRunnable"),
mIsSystemPrincipal(aIsSystemPrincipal),
mFileName(aFileName),
mWindowID(aWindowID),
mLineNumber(aLineNumber),
mColumnNumber(aColumnNumber) {}
NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
nsContentSecurityUtils::NotifyEvalUsage(
mIsSystemPrincipal, mFileName, mWindowID, mLineNumber, mColumnNumber);
return NS_OK;
}
void Revoke() {}
private:
bool mIsSystemPrincipal;
nsCString mFileName;
uint64_t mWindowID;
uint32_t mLineNumber;
uint32_t mColumnNumber;
};
/* static */
bool nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(JSContext* cx,
bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
const nsAString& aScript) {
// This allowlist contains files that are permanently allowed to use
// eval()-like functions. It will ideally be restricted to files that are
// exclusively used in testing contexts.
static nsLiteralCString evalAllowlist[] = {
// Test-only third-party library
// Test-only utility
"resource://gre/modules/translation/cld-worker.js"_ns,
// require.js implements a script loader for workers. It uses eval
// to load the script; but injection is only possible in situations
// that you could otherwise control script that gets executed, so
// it is okay to allow eval() as it adds no additional attack surface.
"resource://gre/modules/workers/require.js"_ns,
// The profiler's symbolication code uses a wasm module to extract symbols
// from the binary files result of local builds.
"resource://devtools/client/performance-new/shared/symbolication.sys.mjs"_ns,
// The Browser Toolbox/Console
"debugger"_ns,
};
// We also permit two specific idioms in eval()-like contexts. We'd like to
// elminate these too; but there are in-the-wild Mozilla privileged extensions
// that use them.
static constexpr auto sAllowedEval1 = u"this"_ns;
static constexpr auto sAllowedEval2 =
u"function anonymous(\n) {\nreturn this\n}"_ns;
if (MOZ_LIKELY(!aIsSystemPrincipal && !XRE_IsE10sParentProcess())) {
// We restrict eval in the system principal and parent process.
// Other uses (like web content and null principal) are allowed.
return true;
}
if (JS::ContextOptionsRef(cx).disableEvalSecurityChecks()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() because this JSContext was set to allow it"));
return true;
}
if (aIsSystemPrincipal &&
StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_with_system_principal()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() with System Principal because allowing pref is "
"enabled"));
return true;
}
if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess() &&
StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_in_parent_process()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() in parent process because allowing pref is "
"enabled"));
return true;
}
DetectJsHacks();
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(sJSHacksPresent)) {
MOZ_LOG(
sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() %s because some "
"JS hacks may be present.",
(aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal" : "in parent process")));
return true;
}
if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess() &&
!StaticPrefs::extensions_webextensions_remote()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() in parent process because the web extension "
"process is disabled"));
return true;
}
// We permit these two common idioms to get access to the global JS object
if (!aScript.IsEmpty() &&
(aScript == sAllowedEval1 || aScript == sAllowedEval2)) {
MOZ_LOG(
sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() %s because a key string is "
"provided",
(aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal" : "in parent process")));
return true;
}
// Check the allowlist for the provided filename. getFilename is a helper
// function
auto location = JSCallingLocation::Get(cx);
const nsCString& fileName = location.FileName();
for (const nsLiteralCString& allowlistEntry : evalAllowlist) {
// checking if current filename begins with entry, because JS Engine
// gives us additional stuff for code inside eval or Function ctor
// e.g., "require.js > Function"
if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, allowlistEntry)) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing eval() %s because the containing "
"file is in the allowlist",
(aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal"
: "in parent process")));
return true;
}
}
// Send Telemetry and Log to the Console
uint64_t windowID = nsJSUtils::GetCurrentlyRunningCodeInnerWindowID(cx);
if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
nsContentSecurityUtils::NotifyEvalUsage(aIsSystemPrincipal, fileName,
windowID, location.mLine,
location.mColumn);
} else {
auto runnable = new EvalUsageNotificationRunnable(
aIsSystemPrincipal, fileName, windowID, location.mLine,
location.mColumn);
NS_DispatchToMainThread(runnable);
}
// Log to MOZ_LOG
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Error,
("Blocking eval() %s from file %s and script "
"provided %s",
(aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal" : "in parent process"),
fileName.get(), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aScript).get()));
// Maybe Crash
#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING)
auto crashString = nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aScript).get(), fileName.get(),
(aIsSystemPrincipal
? "Blocking eval() with System Principal with script %s from file %s"
: "Blocking eval() in parent process with script %s from file %s"));
MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s", crashString.get());
#endif
return false;
}
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityUtils::NotifyEvalUsage(bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
const nsACString& aFileName,
uint64_t aWindowID,
uint32_t aLineNumber,
uint32_t aColumnNumber) {
FilenameTypeAndDetails fileNameTypeAndDetails =
FilenameToFilenameType(aFileName, false);
auto fileinfo = fileNameTypeAndDetails.second;
auto value = Some(fileNameTypeAndDetails.first);
if (aIsSystemPrincipal) {
glean::security::EvalUsageSystemContextExtra extra = {
.fileinfo = fileinfo,
.value = value,
};
glean::security::eval_usage_system_context.Record(Some(extra));
} else {
glean::security::EvalUsageParentProcessExtra extra = {
.fileinfo = fileinfo,
.value = value,
};
glean::security::eval_usage_parent_process.Record(Some(extra));
}
// Report an error to console
nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
if (!console) {
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
if (!error) {
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle;
nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringService =
mozilla::components::StringBundle::Service();
if (!stringService) {
return;
}
stringService->CreateBundle(
"chrome://global/locale/security/security.properties",
getter_AddRefs(bundle));
if (!bundle) {
return;
}
nsAutoString message;
NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 fileNameA(aFileName);
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {fileNameA};
nsresult rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("RestrictBrowserEvalUsage",
formatStrings, message);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
rv = error->InitWithWindowID(message, aFileName, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber,
nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "BrowserEvalUsage",
aWindowID, true /* From chrome context */);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
console->LogMessage(error);
}
// If we detect that one of the relevant prefs has been changed, reset
// sJSHacksChecked to cause us to re-evaluate all the pref values.
// This will stop us from crashing because a user enabled one of these
// prefs during a session and then triggered the JavaScript load mitigation
// (which can cause a crash).
class JSHackPrefObserver final {
public:
JSHackPrefObserver() = default;
static void PrefChanged(const char* aPref, void* aData);
protected:
~JSHackPrefObserver() = default;
};
// static
void JSHackPrefObserver::PrefChanged(const char* aPref, void* aData) {
sJSHacksChecked = false;
}
static bool sJSHackObserverAdded = false;
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectJsHacks() {
// We can only perform the check of this preference on the Main Thread
// (because a String-based preference check is only safe on Main Thread.)
// In theory, it would be possible that a separate thread could get here
// before the main thread, resulting in the other thread not being able to
// perform this check, but the odds of that are small (and probably zero.)
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
return;
}
// If the pref service isn't available, do nothing and re-do this later.
if (!Preferences::IsServiceAvailable()) {
return;
}
// No need to check again.
if (MOZ_LIKELY(sJSHacksChecked || sJSHacksPresent)) {
return;
}
static const char* kObservedPrefs[] = {
"xpinstall.signatures.required", "general.config.filename",
"autoadmin.global_config_url", "autoadmin.failover_to_cached", nullptr};
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(!sJSHackObserverAdded)) {
Preferences::RegisterCallbacks(JSHackPrefObserver::PrefChanged,
kObservedPrefs);
sJSHackObserverAdded = true;
}
nsresult rv;
sJSHacksChecked = true;
// This preference is required by bootstrapLoader.xpi, which is an
// alternate way to load legacy-style extensions. It only works on
// DevEdition/Nightly.
bool xpinstallSignatures;
rv = Preferences::GetBool("xpinstall.signatures.required",
&xpinstallSignatures, PrefValueKind::Default);
if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !xpinstallSignatures) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
rv = Preferences::GetBool("xpinstall.signatures.required",
&xpinstallSignatures, PrefValueKind::User);
if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !xpinstallSignatures) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
if (Preferences::HasDefaultValue("general.config.filename")) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
if (Preferences::HasUserValue("general.config.filename")) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
if (Preferences::HasDefaultValue("autoadmin.global_config_url")) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
if (Preferences::HasUserValue("autoadmin.global_config_url")) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
bool failOverToCache;
rv = Preferences::GetBool("autoadmin.failover_to_cached", &failOverToCache,
PrefValueKind::Default);
if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && failOverToCache) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
return;
}
rv = Preferences::GetBool("autoadmin.failover_to_cached", &failOverToCache,
PrefValueKind::User);
if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && failOverToCache) {
sJSHacksPresent = true;
}
}
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectCssHacks() {
// We can only perform the check of this preference on the Main Thread
// It's possible that this function may therefore race and we expect the
// caller to ensure that the checks have actually happened.
if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
return;
}
// If the pref service isn't available, do nothing and re-do this later.
if (!Preferences::IsServiceAvailable()) {
return;
}
// No need to check again.
if (MOZ_LIKELY(sCSSHacksChecked || sCSSHacksPresent)) {
return;
}
// This preference is a bool to see if userChrome css is loaded
bool customStylesPresent = Preferences::GetBool(
"toolkit.legacyUserProfileCustomizations.stylesheets", false);
if (customStylesPresent) {
sCSSHacksPresent = true;
}
sCSSHacksChecked = true;
}
/* static */
nsresult nsContentSecurityUtils::GetHttpChannelFromPotentialMultiPart(
nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIHttpChannel** aHttpChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
if (httpChannel) {
httpChannel.forget(aHttpChannel);
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIMultiPartChannel> multipart = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
if (!multipart) {
*aHttpChannel = nullptr;
return NS_OK;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> baseChannel;
nsresult rv = multipart->GetBaseChannel(getter_AddRefs(baseChannel));
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(baseChannel);
httpChannel.forget(aHttpChannel);
return NS_OK;
}
nsresult CheckCSPFrameAncestorPolicy(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsIContentSecurityPolicy** aOutCSP) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
ExtContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
// frame-ancestor check only makes sense for subdocument and object loads,
// if this is not a load of such type, there is nothing to do here.
if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
return NS_OK;
}
// CSP can only hang off an http channel, if this channel is not
// an http channel then there is nothing to do here,
// except with add-ons, where the CSP is stored in a WebExtensionPolicy.
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel;
nsresult rv = nsContentSecurityUtils::GetHttpChannelFromPotentialMultiPart(
aChannel, getter_AddRefs(httpChannel));
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
nsAutoCString tCspHeaderValue, tCspROHeaderValue;
if (httpChannel) {
Unused << httpChannel->GetResponseHeader("content-security-policy"_ns,
tCspHeaderValue);
Unused << httpChannel->GetResponseHeader(
"content-security-policy-report-only"_ns, tCspROHeaderValue);
// if there are no CSP values, then there is nothing to do here.
if (tCspHeaderValue.IsEmpty() && tCspROHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
return NS_OK;
}
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> resultPrincipal;
rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelResultPrincipal(
aChannel, getter_AddRefs(resultPrincipal));
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
RefPtr<extensions::WebExtensionPolicy> addonPolicy;
if (!httpChannel) {
addonPolicy = BasePrincipal::Cast(resultPrincipal)->AddonPolicy();
if (!addonPolicy) {
// Neither a HTTP channel, nor a moz-extension:-resource.
// CSP is not supported.
return NS_OK;
}
}
RefPtr<nsCSPContext> csp = new nsCSPContext();
// This CSPContext is only used for checking frame-ancestors, we
// will parse the CSP again anyway. (Unless this blocks the load, but
// parser warnings aren't really important in that case)
csp->SuppressParserLogMessages();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> selfURI;
nsAutoCString referrerSpec;
if (httpChannel) {
aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(selfURI));
nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo = httpChannel->GetReferrerInfo();
if (referrerInfo) {
referrerInfo->GetComputedReferrerSpec(referrerSpec);
}
} else {
// aChannel::GetURI would return the jar: or file:-URI for extensions.
// Use the "final" URI to get the actual moz-extension:-URL.
NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(selfURI));
}
uint64_t innerWindowID = loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID();
rv = csp->SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(resultPrincipal, selfURI,
referrerSpec, innerWindowID);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return rv;
}
if (addonPolicy) {
csp->AppendPolicy(addonPolicy->BaseCSP(), false, false);
csp->AppendPolicy(addonPolicy->ExtensionPageCSP(), false, false);
} else {
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 cspHeaderValue(tCspHeaderValue);
NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 cspROHeaderValue(tCspROHeaderValue);
// ----- if there's a full-strength CSP header, apply it.
if (!cspHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
rv = CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(csp, cspHeaderValue, false);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
// ----- if there's a report-only CSP header, apply it.
if (!cspROHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
rv = CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(csp, cspROHeaderValue, true);
NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
}
}
// ----- Enforce frame-ancestor policy on any applied policies
bool safeAncestry = false;
// PermitsAncestry sends violation reports when necessary
rv = csp->PermitsAncestry(loadInfo, &safeAncestry);
if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !safeAncestry) {
// stop! ERROR page!
return NS_ERROR_CSP_FRAME_ANCESTOR_VIOLATION;
}
// return the CSP for x-frame-options check
csp.forget(aOutCSP);
return NS_OK;
}
void EnforceCSPFrameAncestorPolicy(nsIChannel* aChannel,
const nsresult& aError) {
if (aError == NS_ERROR_CSP_FRAME_ANCESTOR_VIOLATION) {
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CSP_FRAME_ANCESTOR_VIOLATION);
}
}
void EnforceXFrameOptionsCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
bool isFrameOptionsIgnored = false;
// check for XFO options
// XFO checks can be skipped if there are frame ancestors
if (!FramingChecker::CheckFrameOptions(aChannel, aCsp,
isFrameOptionsIgnored)) {
// stop! ERROR page!
aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_XFO_VIOLATION);
}
if (isFrameOptionsIgnored) {
// log warning to console that xfo is ignored because of CSP
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
uint64_t innerWindowID = loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID();
bool privateWindow = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().IsPrivateBrowsing();
AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {u"x-frame-options"_ns,
u"frame-ancestors"_ns};
CSP_LogLocalizedStr("IgnoringSrcBecauseOfDirective", params,
""_ns, // no sourcefile
u""_ns, // no scriptsample
0, // no linenumber
1, // no columnnumber
nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
"IgnoringSrcBecauseOfDirective"_ns, innerWindowID,
privateWindow);
}
}
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityUtils::PerformCSPFrameAncestorAndXFOCheck(
nsIChannel* aChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
nsresult rv = CheckCSPFrameAncestorPolicy(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(csp));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
EnforceCSPFrameAncestorPolicy(aChannel, rv);
return;
}
// X-Frame-Options needs to be enforced after CSP frame-ancestors
// checks because if frame-ancestors is present, then x-frame-options
// will be discarded
EnforceXFrameOptionsCheck(aChannel, csp);
}
/* static */
bool nsContentSecurityUtils::CheckCSPFrameAncestorAndXFO(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
nsresult rv = CheckCSPFrameAncestorPolicy(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(csp));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return false;
}
bool isFrameOptionsIgnored = false;
return FramingChecker::CheckFrameOptions(aChannel, csp,
isFrameOptionsIgnored);
}
/* static */
nsString nsContentSecurityUtils::GetIsElementNonceableNonce(
const Element& aElement) {
// Step 1. If element does not have an attribute named "nonce", return "Not
// Nonceable".
nsString nonce;
if (nsString* cspNonce =
static_cast<nsString*>(aElement.GetProperty(nsGkAtoms::nonce))) {
nonce = *cspNonce;
}
if (nonce.IsEmpty()) {
return nonce;
}
// Step 2. If element is a script element, then for each attribute of
// element’s attribute list:
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptElement> script =
do_QueryInterface(const_cast<Element*>(&aElement))) {
auto containsScriptOrStyle = [](const nsAString& aStr) {
return aStr.LowerCaseFindASCII("<script") != kNotFound ||
aStr.LowerCaseFindASCII("<style") != kNotFound;
};
nsString value;
uint32_t i = 0;
while (BorrowedAttrInfo info = aElement.GetAttrInfoAt(i++)) {
// Step 2.1. If attribute’s name contains an ASCII case-insensitive match
// for "<script" or "<style", return "Not Nonceable".
const nsAttrName* name = info.mName;
if (nsAtom* prefix = name->GetPrefix()) {
if (containsScriptOrStyle(nsDependentAtomString(prefix))) {
return EmptyString();
}
}
if (containsScriptOrStyle(nsDependentAtomString(name->LocalName()))) {
return EmptyString();
}
// Step 2.2. If attribute’s value contains an ASCII case-insensitive match
// for "<script" or "<style", return "Not Nonceable".
info.mValue->ToString(value);
if (containsScriptOrStyle(value)) {
return EmptyString();
}
}
}
// Step 3. If element had a duplicate-attribute parse error during
// tokenization, return "Not Nonceable".
if (aElement.HasFlag(ELEMENT_PARSER_HAD_DUPLICATE_ATTR_ERROR)) {
return EmptyString();
}
// Step 4. Return "Nonceable".
return nonce;
}
#if defined(DEBUG)
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityUtils::AssertAboutPageHasCSP(Document* aDocument) {
// We want to get to a point where all about: pages ship with a CSP. This
// assertion ensures that we can not deploy new about: pages without a CSP.
// Please note that any about: page should not use inline JS or inline CSS,
// and instead should load JS and CSS from an external file (*.js, *.css)
// which allows us to apply a strong CSP omitting 'unsafe-inline'. Ideally,
// the CSP allows precisely the resources that need to be loaded; but it
// should at least be as strong as:
// <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src chrome:;
// object-src 'none'"/>
// This is a data document, created using DOMParser or
// document.implementation.createDocument() or such, not an about: page which
// is loaded as a web page.
if (aDocument->IsLoadedAsData()) {
return;
}
// Check if we should skip the assertion
if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_skip_about_page_has_csp_assert()) {
return;
}
// Check if we are loading an about: URI at all
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> documentURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
if (!documentURI->SchemeIs("about")) {
return;
}
nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aDocument->GetCsp();
bool foundDefaultSrc = false;
bool foundObjectSrc = false;
bool foundUnsafeEval = false;
bool foundUnsafeInline = false;
bool foundScriptSrc = false;
bool foundWorkerSrc = false;
bool foundWebScheme = false;
if (csp) {
uint32_t policyCount = 0;
csp->GetPolicyCount(&policyCount);
nsAutoString parsedPolicyStr;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < policyCount; ++i) {
csp->GetPolicyString(i, parsedPolicyStr);
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"default-src") >= 0) {
foundDefaultSrc = true;
}
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"object-src 'none'") >= 0) {
foundObjectSrc = true;
}
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"'unsafe-eval'") >= 0) {
foundUnsafeEval = true;
}
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"'unsafe-inline'") >= 0) {
foundUnsafeInline = true;
}
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"script-src") >= 0) {
foundScriptSrc = true;
}
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"worker-src") >= 0) {
foundWorkerSrc = true;
}
if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"http:") >= 0 ||
parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"https:") >= 0) {
foundWebScheme = true;
}
}
}
// Check if we should skip the allowlist and assert right away. Please note
// that this pref can and should only be set for automated testing.
if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_skip_about_page_csp_allowlist_and_assert()) {
NS_ASSERTION(foundDefaultSrc, "about: page must have a CSP");
return;
}
nsAutoCString aboutSpec;
documentURI->GetSpec(aboutSpec);
ToLowerCase(aboutSpec);
// This allowlist contains about: pages that are permanently allowed to
// render without a CSP applied.
static nsLiteralCString sAllowedAboutPagesWithNoCSP[] = {
// about:blank is a special about page -> no CSP
"about:blank"_ns,
// about:srcdoc is a special about page -> no CSP
"about:srcdoc"_ns,
// about:sync-log displays plain text only -> no CSP
"about:sync-log"_ns,
// about:logo just displays the firefox logo -> no CSP
"about:logo"_ns,
// about:sync is a special mozilla-signed developer addon with low usage
// ->
// no CSP
"about:sync"_ns,
# if defined(ANDROID)
"about:config"_ns,
# endif
};
for (const nsLiteralCString& allowlistEntry : sAllowedAboutPagesWithNoCSP) {
// please note that we perform a substring match here on purpose,
// so we don't have to deal and parse out all the query arguments
// the various about pages rely on.
if (StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, allowlistEntry)) {
return;
}
}
MOZ_ASSERT(foundDefaultSrc,
"about: page must contain a CSP including default-src");
MOZ_ASSERT(foundObjectSrc,
"about: page must contain a CSP denying object-src");
// preferences and downloads allow legacy inline scripts through hash src.
MOZ_ASSERT(
!foundScriptSrc || StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:preferences"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:settings"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:downloads"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:fingerprintingprotection"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:asrouter"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:newtab"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:logins"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:compat"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:welcome"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:profiling"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:studies"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:home"_ns),
"about: page must not contain a CSP including script-src");
MOZ_ASSERT(!foundWorkerSrc,
"about: page must not contain a CSP including worker-src");
// addons, preferences, debugging, ion, devtools all have to allow some
// remote web resources
MOZ_ASSERT(!foundWebScheme ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:preferences"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:settings"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:addons"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:newtab"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:debugging"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:ion"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:compat"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:logins"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:home"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:welcome"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:devtools"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:pocket-saved"_ns) ||
StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:pocket-home"_ns),
"about: page must not contain a CSP including a web scheme");
if (aDocument->IsExtensionPage()) {
// Extensions have two CSP policies applied where the baseline CSP
// includes 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline', hence we have to skip
// the 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline' assertions for extension
// pages.
return;
}
MOZ_ASSERT(!foundUnsafeEval,
"about: page must not contain a CSP including 'unsafe-eval'");
static nsLiteralCString sLegacyUnsafeInlineAllowList[] = {
// about:preferences
"about:preferences"_ns,
"about:settings"_ns,
"about:addons"_ns,
// * about:newtab
// * about:welcome
// * about:home
"about:newtab"_ns,
"about:welcome"_ns,
"about:home"_ns,
};
for (const nsLiteralCString& aUnsafeInlineEntry :
sLegacyUnsafeInlineAllowList) {
// please note that we perform a substring match here on purpose,
// so we don't have to deal and parse out all the query arguments
// the various about pages rely on.
if (StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, aUnsafeInlineEntry)) {
return;
}
}
MOZ_ASSERT(!foundUnsafeInline,
"about: page must not contain a CSP including 'unsafe-inline'");
}
#endif
/* static */
bool nsContentSecurityUtils::ValidateScriptFilename(JSContext* cx,
const char* aFilename) {
// If the pref is permissive, allow everything
if (StaticPrefs::security_allow_parent_unrestricted_js_loads()) {
return true;
}
// If we're not in the parent process allow everything (presently)
if (!XRE_IsE10sParentProcess()) {
return true;
}
// If we have allowed eval (because of a user configuration or more
// likely a test has requested it), and the script is an eval, allow it.
nsDependentCString filename(aFilename);
if (StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_with_system_principal() ||
StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_in_parent_process()) {
if (StringEndsWith(filename, "> eval"_ns)) {
return true;
}
}
DetectJsHacks();
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(!sJSHacksChecked)) {
MOZ_LOG(
sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing a javascript load of %s because "
"we have not yet been able to determine if JS hacks may be present",
aFilename));
return true;
}
if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(sJSHacksPresent)) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing a javascript load of %s because "
"some JS hacks may be present",
aFilename));
return true;
}
if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess() &&
!StaticPrefs::extensions_webextensions_remote()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing a javascript load of %s because the web extension "
"process is disabled.",
aFilename));
return true;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(filename, "chrome://"_ns)) {
// If it's a chrome:// url, allow it
return true;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(filename, "resource://"_ns)) {
// If it's a resource:// url, allow it
return true;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(filename, "file://"_ns)) {
// We will temporarily allow all file:// URIs through for now
return true;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(filename, "jar:file://"_ns)) {
// We will temporarily allow all jar URIs through for now
return true;
}
if (filename.Equals("about:sync-log"_ns)) {
// about:sync-log runs in the parent process and displays a directory
// listing. The listing has inline javascript that executes on load.
return true;
}
if (StringBeginsWith(filename, "moz-extension://"_ns)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), aFilename);
if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && NS_IsMainThread()) {
mozilla::extensions::URLInfo url(uri);
auto* policy =
ExtensionPolicyService::GetSingleton().GetByHost(url.Host());
if (policy && policy->IsPrivileged()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing a javascript load of %s because the web extension "
"it is associated with is privileged.",
aFilename));
return true;
}
}
} else if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate = GetWorkerPrivateFromContext(cx);
if (workerPrivate && workerPrivate->IsPrivilegedAddonGlobal()) {
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
("Allowing a javascript load of %s because the web extension "
"it is associated with is privileged.",
aFilename));
return true;
}
}
auto kAllowedFilenamesPrefix = {
// Until 371900 is fixed, we need to do something about about:downloads
// and this is the most reasonable. See 1727770
"about:downloads"_ns,
// We think this is the same problem as about:downloads
"about:preferences"_ns, "about:settings"_ns,
// Browser console will give a filename of 'debugger' See 1763943
// Sometimes it's 'debugger eager eval code', other times just 'debugger
// eval code'
"debugger"_ns};
for (auto allowedFilenamePrefix : kAllowedFilenamesPrefix) {
if (StringBeginsWith(filename, allowedFilenamePrefix)) {
return true;
}
}
// Log to MOZ_LOG
MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Error,
("ValidateScriptFilename Failed: %s\n", aFilename));
FilenameTypeAndDetails fileNameTypeAndDetails =
FilenameToFilenameType(filename, true);
glean::security::JavascriptLoadParentProcessExtra extra = {
.fileinfo = fileNameTypeAndDetails.second,
.value = Some(fileNameTypeAndDetails.first),
};
glean::security::javascript_load_parent_process.Record(Some(extra));
#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING)
auto crashString = nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
aFilename,
fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()
? fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value().get()
: "(None)",
"Blocking a script load %s from file %s");
MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s", crashString.get());
#elif defined(EARLY_BETA_OR_EARLIER)
// Cause a crash (if we've never crashed before and we can ensure we won't do
// it again.)
// The details in the second arg, passed to UNSAFE_PRINTF, are also included
// in Event Telemetry and have received data review.
if (fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()) {
PossiblyCrash("js_load_1", aFilename,
fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value());
} else {
PossiblyCrash("js_load_1", aFilename, "(None)"_ns);
}
#endif
// Presently we are only enforcing restrictions for the script filename
// on Nightly. On all channels we are reporting Telemetry. In the future we
// will assert in debug builds and return false to prevent execution in
// non-debug builds.
#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD
return false;
#else
return true;
#endif
}
/* static */
void nsContentSecurityUtils::LogMessageToConsole(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel,
const char* aMsg) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
uint64_t windowID = 0;
rv = aChannel->GetTopLevelContentWindowId(&windowID);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return;
}
if (!windowID) {
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(&windowID);
}
nsAutoString localizedMsg;
nsAutoCString spec;
uri->GetSpec(spec);
AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec)};
rv = nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(
nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aMsg, params, localizedMsg);
if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
return;
}
nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(
localizedMsg, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Security"_ns, windowID,
SourceLocation{uri.get()});
}
/* static */
long nsContentSecurityUtils::ClassifyDownload(
nsIChannel* aChannel, const nsAutoCString& aMimeTypeGuess) {
MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "IsDownloadAllowed without channel?");
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> contentLocation;
aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(contentLocation));
nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
if (!loadingPrincipal) {
loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
}
// Creating a fake Loadinfo that is just used for the MCB check.
nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> secCheckLoadInfo = new mozilla::net::LoadInfo(
loadingPrincipal, loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal(), nullptr,
nsILoadInfo::SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK,
nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH);
// Disable HTTPS-Only checks for that loadinfo. This is required because
// otherwise nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad would assume that the request
// is safe, because HTTPS-Only is handling it.
secCheckLoadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT);
int16_t decission = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(false, // aHadInsecureImageRedirect
contentLocation, // aContentLocation,
secCheckLoadInfo, // aLoadinfo
false, // aReportError
&decission // aDecision
);
if (StaticPrefs::dom_block_download_insecure() &&
decission != nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
if (httpChannel) {
LogMessageToConsole(httpChannel, "MixedContentBlockedDownload");
}
return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_POTENTIALLY_UNSAFE;
}
if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_ACCEPTABLE;
}
uint32_t triggeringFlags = loadInfo->GetTriggeringSandboxFlags();
uint32_t currentflags = loadInfo->GetSandboxFlags();
if ((triggeringFlags & SANDBOXED_ALLOW_DOWNLOADS) ||
(currentflags & SANDBOXED_ALLOW_DOWNLOADS)) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
if (httpChannel) {
LogMessageToConsole(httpChannel, "IframeSandboxBlockedDownload");
}
return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_FORBIDDEN;
}
return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_ACCEPTABLE;
}