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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
const lazy = {};
ChromeUtils.defineLazyGetter(lazy, "gDOMBundle", () =>
Services.strings.createBundle("chrome://global/locale/dom/dom.properties")
);
// getCryptoParamsFromHeaders is exported for test purposes.
const UTF8 = new TextEncoder();
const ECDH_KEY = { name: "ECDH", namedCurve: "P-256" };
const ECDSA_KEY = { name: "ECDSA", namedCurve: "P-256" };
const HMAC_SHA256 = { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" };
const NONCE_INFO = UTF8.encode("Content-Encoding: nonce");
// A default keyid with a name that won't conflict with a real keyid.
const DEFAULT_KEYID = "";
/** Localized error property names. */
// `Encryption` header missing or malformed.
const BAD_ENCRYPTION_HEADER = "PushMessageBadEncryptionHeader";
// `Crypto-Key` or legacy `Encryption-Key` header missing.
const BAD_CRYPTO_KEY_HEADER = "PushMessageBadCryptoKeyHeader";
const BAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER = "PushMessageBadEncryptionKeyHeader";
// `Content-Encoding` header missing or contains unsupported encoding.
const BAD_ENCODING_HEADER = "PushMessageBadEncodingHeader";
// `dh` parameter of `Crypto-Key` header missing or not base64url-encoded.
const BAD_DH_PARAM = "PushMessageBadSenderKey";
// `salt` parameter of `Encryption` header missing or not base64url-encoded.
const BAD_SALT_PARAM = "PushMessageBadSalt";
// `rs` parameter of `Encryption` header not a number or less than pad size.
const BAD_RS_PARAM = "PushMessageBadRecordSize";
// Invalid or insufficient padding for encrypted chunk.
const BAD_PADDING = "PushMessageBadPaddingError";
// Generic crypto error.
const BAD_CRYPTO = "PushMessageBadCryptoError";
class CryptoError extends Error {
/**
* Creates an error object indicating an incoming push message could not be
* decrypted.
*
* @param {String} message A human-readable error message. This is only for
* internal module logging, and doesn't need to be localized.
* @param {String} property The localized property name from `dom.properties`.
* @param {String...} params Substitutions to insert into the localized
* string.
*/
constructor(message, property, ...params) {
super(message);
this.isCryptoError = true;
this.property = property;
this.params = params;
}
/**
* Formats a localized string for reporting decryption errors to the Web
* Console.
*
* @param {String} scope The scope of the service worker receiving the
* message, prepended to any other substitutions in the string.
* @returns {String} The localized string.
*/
format(scope) {
let params = [scope, ...this.params].map(String);
return lazy.gDOMBundle.formatStringFromName(this.property, params);
}
}
function getEncryptionKeyParams(encryptKeyField) {
if (!encryptKeyField) {
return null;
}
var params = encryptKeyField.split(",");
return params.reduce((m, p) => {
var pmap = p.split(";").reduce(parseHeaderFieldParams, {});
if (pmap.keyid && pmap.dh) {
m[pmap.keyid] = pmap.dh;
}
if (!m[DEFAULT_KEYID] && pmap.dh) {
m[DEFAULT_KEYID] = pmap.dh;
}
return m;
}, {});
}
function getEncryptionParams(encryptField) {
if (!encryptField) {
throw new CryptoError("Missing encryption header", BAD_ENCRYPTION_HEADER);
}
var p = encryptField.split(",", 1)[0];
if (!p) {
throw new CryptoError(
"Encryption header missing params",
BAD_ENCRYPTION_HEADER
);
}
return p.split(";").reduce(parseHeaderFieldParams, {});
}
// Extracts the sender public key, salt, and record size from the payload for the
// aes128gcm scheme.
function getCryptoParamsFromPayload(payload) {
if (payload.byteLength < 21) {
// | salt (16) | rs (4) | idlen (1) | keyid (idlen) |
throw new CryptoError("Truncated header", BAD_CRYPTO);
}
let rs =
(payload[16] << 24) |
(payload[17] << 16) |
(payload[18] << 8) |
payload[19];
if (rs < 18) {
throw new CryptoError(
"Record sizes smaller than 18 are invalid",
BAD_RS_PARAM
);
}
let keyIdLen = payload[20];
if (keyIdLen != 65) {
throw new CryptoError("Invalid sender public key", BAD_DH_PARAM);
}
if (payload.byteLength <= 21 + keyIdLen) {
throw new CryptoError("Truncated payload", BAD_CRYPTO);
}
return {
salt: payload.slice(0, 16),
rs,
senderKey: payload.slice(21, 21 + keyIdLen),
ciphertext: payload.slice(21 + keyIdLen),
};
}
// Extracts the sender public key, salt, and record size from the `Crypto-Key`,
// `Encryption-Key`, and `Encryption` headers for the aesgcm and aesgcm128
// schemes.
export function getCryptoParamsFromHeaders(headers) {
if (!headers) {
return null;
}
var keymap;
if (headers.encoding == AESGCM_ENCODING) {
// aesgcm uses the Crypto-Key header, 2 bytes for the pad length, and an
// authentication secret.
keymap = getEncryptionKeyParams(headers.crypto_key);
if (!keymap) {
throw new CryptoError("Missing Crypto-Key header", BAD_CRYPTO_KEY_HEADER);
}
} else if (headers.encoding == AESGCM128_ENCODING) {
// aesgcm128 uses Encryption-Key, 1 byte for the pad length, and no secret.
keymap = getEncryptionKeyParams(headers.encryption_key);
if (!keymap) {
throw new CryptoError(
"Missing Encryption-Key header",
BAD_ENCRYPTION_KEY_HEADER
);
}
}
var enc = getEncryptionParams(headers.encryption);
var dh = keymap[enc.keyid || DEFAULT_KEYID];
var senderKey = base64URLDecode(dh);
if (!senderKey) {
throw new CryptoError("Invalid dh parameter", BAD_DH_PARAM);
}
var salt = base64URLDecode(enc.salt);
if (!salt) {
throw new CryptoError("Invalid salt parameter", BAD_SALT_PARAM);
}
var rs = enc.rs ? parseInt(enc.rs, 10) : 4096;
if (isNaN(rs) || rs < 1 || rs > 68719476705) {
throw new CryptoError(
"rs parameter must be a number greater than 1 and smaller than 2^36-31",
BAD_RS_PARAM
);
}
return {
salt,
rs,
senderKey,
};
}
// Decodes an unpadded, base64url-encoded string.
function base64URLDecode(string) {
if (!string) {
return null;
}
try {
return ChromeUtils.base64URLDecode(string, {
// draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-01 prohibits padding.
padding: "reject",
});
} catch (ex) {}
return null;
}
var parseHeaderFieldParams = (m, v) => {
var i = v.indexOf("=");
if (i >= 0) {
// A quoted string with internal quotes is invalid for all the possible
// values of this header field.
m[v.substring(0, i).trim()] = v
.substring(i + 1)
.trim()
.replace(/^"(.*)"$/, "$1");
}
return m;
};
function chunkArray(array, size) {
var start = array.byteOffset || 0;
array = array.buffer || array;
var index = 0;
var result = [];
while (index + size <= array.byteLength) {
result.push(new Uint8Array(array, start + index, size));
index += size;
}
if (index < array.byteLength) {
result.push(new Uint8Array(array, start + index));
}
return result;
}
function concatArray(arrays) {
var size = arrays.reduce((total, a) => total + a.byteLength, 0);
var index = 0;
return arrays.reduce((result, a) => {
result.set(new Uint8Array(a), index);
index += a.byteLength;
return result;
}, new Uint8Array(size));
}
function hmac(key) {
this.keyPromise = crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", key, HMAC_SHA256, false, [
"sign",
]);
}
hmac.prototype.hash = function (input) {
return this.keyPromise.then(k => crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", k, input));
};
function hkdf(salt, ikm) {
this.prkhPromise = new hmac(salt).hash(ikm).then(prk => new hmac(prk));
}
hkdf.prototype.extract = function (info, len) {
var input = concatArray([info, new Uint8Array([1])]);
return this.prkhPromise
.then(prkh => prkh.hash(input))
.then(h => {
if (h.byteLength < len) {
throw new CryptoError("HKDF length is too long", BAD_CRYPTO);
}
return h.slice(0, len);
});
};
/* generate a 96-bit nonce for use in GCM, 48-bits of which are populated */
function generateNonce(base, index) {
if (index >= Math.pow(2, 48)) {
throw new CryptoError("Nonce index is too large", BAD_CRYPTO);
}
var nonce = base.slice(0, 12);
nonce = new Uint8Array(nonce);
for (var i = 0; i < 6; ++i) {
nonce[nonce.byteLength - 1 - i] ^= (index / Math.pow(256, i)) & 0xff;
}
return nonce;
}
function encodeLength(buffer) {
return new Uint8Array([0, buffer.byteLength]);
}
class Decoder {
/**
* Creates a decoder for decrypting an incoming push message.
*
* @param {JsonWebKey} privateKey The static subscription private key.
* @param {BufferSource} publicKey The static subscription public key.
* @param {BufferSource} authenticationSecret The subscription authentication
* secret, or `null` if not used by the scheme.
* @param {Object} cryptoParams An object containing the ephemeral sender
* public key, salt, and record size.
* @param {BufferSource} ciphertext The encrypted message data.
*/
constructor(
privateKey,
publicKey,
authenticationSecret,
cryptoParams,
ciphertext
) {
this.privateKey = privateKey;
this.publicKey = publicKey;
this.authenticationSecret = authenticationSecret;
this.senderKey = cryptoParams.senderKey;
this.salt = cryptoParams.salt;
this.rs = cryptoParams.rs;
this.ciphertext = ciphertext;
}
/**
* Derives the decryption keys and decodes the push message.
*
* @throws {CryptoError} if decryption fails.
* @returns {Uint8Array} The decrypted message data.
*/
async decode() {
if (this.ciphertext.byteLength === 0) {
// Zero length messages will be passed as null.
return null;
}
try {
let ikm = await this.computeSharedSecret();
let [gcmBits, nonce] = await this.deriveKeyAndNonce(ikm);
let key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
"raw",
gcmBits,
"AES-GCM",
false,
["decrypt"]
);
let r = await Promise.all(
chunkArray(this.ciphertext, this.chunkSize).map(
(slice, index, chunks) =>
this.decodeChunk(
slice,
index,
nonce,
key,
index >= chunks.length - 1
)
)
);
return concatArray(r);
} catch (error) {
if (error.isCryptoError) {
throw error;
}
// Web Crypto returns an unhelpful "operation failed for an
// operation-specific reason" error if decryption fails. We don't have
// context about what went wrong, so we throw a generic error instead.
throw new CryptoError("Bad encryption", BAD_CRYPTO);
}
}
/**
* Computes the ECDH shared secret, used as the input key material for HKDF.
*
* @throws if the static or ephemeral ECDH keys are invalid.
* @returns {ArrayBuffer} The shared secret.
*/
async computeSharedSecret() {
let [appServerKey, subscriptionPrivateKey] = await Promise.all([
crypto.subtle.importKey("raw", this.senderKey, ECDH_KEY, false, []),
crypto.subtle.importKey("jwk", this.privateKey, ECDH_KEY, false, [
"deriveBits",
]),
]);
return crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
{ name: "ECDH", public: appServerKey },
subscriptionPrivateKey,
256
);
}
/**
* Derives the content encryption key and nonce.
*
* @param {BufferSource} ikm The ECDH shared secret.
* @returns {Array} A `[gcmBits, nonce]` tuple.
*/
async deriveKeyAndNonce() {
throw new Error("Missing `deriveKeyAndNonce` implementation");
}
/**
* Decrypts and removes padding from an encrypted record.
*
* @throws {CryptoError} if decryption fails or padding is incorrect.
* @param {Uint8Array} slice The encrypted record.
* @param {Number} index The record sequence number.
* @param {Uint8Array} nonce The nonce base, used to generate the IV.
* @param {Uint8Array} key The content encryption key.
* @param {Boolean} last Indicates if this is the final record.
* @returns {Uint8Array} The decrypted block with padding removed.
*/
async decodeChunk(slice, index, nonce, key, last) {
let params = {
name: "AES-GCM",
iv: generateNonce(nonce, index),
};
let decoded = await crypto.subtle.decrypt(params, key, slice);
return this.unpadChunk(new Uint8Array(decoded), last);
}
/**
* Removes padding from a decrypted block.
*
* @throws {CryptoError} if padding is missing or invalid.
* @param {Uint8Array} chunk The decrypted block with padding.
* @returns {Uint8Array} The block with padding removed.
*/
unpadChunk() {
throw new Error("Missing `unpadChunk` implementation");
}
/** The record chunking size. */
get chunkSize() {
throw new Error("Missing `chunkSize` implementation");
}
}
class OldSchemeDecoder extends Decoder {
async decode() {
// For aesgcm and aesgcm128, the ciphertext length can't fall on a record
// boundary.
if (
this.ciphertext.byteLength > 0 &&
this.ciphertext.byteLength % this.chunkSize === 0
) {
throw new CryptoError("Encrypted data truncated", BAD_CRYPTO);
}
return super.decode();
}
/**
* For aesgcm, the padding length is a 16-bit unsigned big endian integer.
* For aesgcm128, the padding is an 8-bit integer.
*/
unpadChunk(decoded) {
if (decoded.length < this.padSize) {
throw new CryptoError("Decoded array is too short!", BAD_PADDING);
}
var pad = decoded[0];
if (this.padSize == 2) {
pad = (pad << 8) | decoded[1];
}
if (pad > decoded.length - this.padSize) {
throw new CryptoError("Padding is wrong!", BAD_PADDING);
}
// All padded bytes must be zero except the first one.
for (var i = this.padSize; i < this.padSize + pad; i++) {
if (decoded[i] !== 0) {
throw new CryptoError("Padding is wrong!", BAD_PADDING);
}
}
return decoded.slice(pad + this.padSize);
}
/**
* aesgcm and aesgcm128 don't account for the authentication tag as part of
* the record size.
*/
get chunkSize() {
return this.rs + 16;
}
get padSize() {
throw new Error("Missing `padSize` implementation");
}
}
/** New encryption scheme (draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-06). */
const AES128GCM_ENCODING = "aes128gcm";
const AES128GCM_KEY_INFO = UTF8.encode("Content-Encoding: aes128gcm\0");
const AES128GCM_AUTH_INFO = UTF8.encode("WebPush: info\0");
const AES128GCM_NONCE_INFO = UTF8.encode("Content-Encoding: nonce\0");
class aes128gcmDecoder extends Decoder {
/**
* Derives the aes128gcm decryption key and nonce. The PRK info string for
* HKDF is "WebPush: info\0", followed by the unprefixed receiver and sender
* public keys.
*/
async deriveKeyAndNonce(ikm) {
let authKdf = new hkdf(this.authenticationSecret, ikm);
let authInfo = concatArray([
AES128GCM_AUTH_INFO,
this.publicKey,
this.senderKey,
]);
let prk = await authKdf.extract(authInfo, 32);
let prkKdf = new hkdf(this.salt, prk);
return Promise.all([
prkKdf.extract(AES128GCM_KEY_INFO, 16),
prkKdf.extract(AES128GCM_NONCE_INFO, 12),
]);
}
unpadChunk(decoded, last) {
let length = decoded.length;
while (length--) {
if (decoded[length] === 0) {
continue;
}
let recordPad = last ? 2 : 1;
if (decoded[length] != recordPad) {
throw new CryptoError("Padding is wrong!", BAD_PADDING);
}
return decoded.slice(0, length);
}
throw new CryptoError("Zero plaintext", BAD_PADDING);
}
/** aes128gcm accounts for the authentication tag in the record size. */
get chunkSize() {
return this.rs;
}
}
/** Older encryption scheme (draft-ietf-httpbis-encryption-encoding-01). */
const AESGCM_ENCODING = "aesgcm";
const AESGCM_KEY_INFO = UTF8.encode("Content-Encoding: aesgcm\0");
const AESGCM_AUTH_INFO = UTF8.encode("Content-Encoding: auth\0"); // note nul-terminus
const AESGCM_P256DH_INFO = UTF8.encode("P-256\0");
class aesgcmDecoder extends OldSchemeDecoder {
/**
* Derives the aesgcm decryption key and nonce. We mix the authentication
* secret with the ikm using HKDF. The context string for the PRK is
* "Content-Encoding: auth\0". The context string for the key and nonce is
* "Content-Encoding: <blah>\0P-256\0" then the length and value of both the
* receiver key and sender key.
*/
async deriveKeyAndNonce(ikm) {
// Since we are using an authentication secret, we need to run an extra
// round of HKDF with the authentication secret as salt.
let authKdf = new hkdf(this.authenticationSecret, ikm);
let prk = await authKdf.extract(AESGCM_AUTH_INFO, 32);
let prkKdf = new hkdf(this.salt, prk);
let keyInfo = concatArray([
AESGCM_KEY_INFO,
AESGCM_P256DH_INFO,
encodeLength(this.publicKey),
this.publicKey,
encodeLength(this.senderKey),
this.senderKey,
]);
let nonceInfo = concatArray([
NONCE_INFO,
new Uint8Array([0]),
AESGCM_P256DH_INFO,
encodeLength(this.publicKey),
this.publicKey,
encodeLength(this.senderKey),
this.senderKey,
]);
return Promise.all([
prkKdf.extract(keyInfo, 16),
prkKdf.extract(nonceInfo, 12),
]);
}
get padSize() {
return 2;
}
}
/** Oldest encryption scheme (draft-thomson-http-encryption-02). */
const AESGCM128_ENCODING = "aesgcm128";
const AESGCM128_KEY_INFO = UTF8.encode("Content-Encoding: aesgcm128");
class aesgcm128Decoder extends OldSchemeDecoder {
constructor(privateKey, publicKey, cryptoParams, ciphertext) {
super(privateKey, publicKey, null, cryptoParams, ciphertext);
}
/**
* The aesgcm128 scheme ignores the authentication secret, and uses
* "Content-Encoding: <blah>" for the context string. It should eventually
*/
deriveKeyAndNonce(ikm) {
let prkKdf = new hkdf(this.salt, ikm);
return Promise.all([
prkKdf.extract(AESGCM128_KEY_INFO, 16),
prkKdf.extract(NONCE_INFO, 12),
]);
}
get padSize() {
return 1;
}
}
export var PushCrypto = {
concatArray,
generateAuthenticationSecret() {
return crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
},
validateAppServerKey(key) {
return crypto.subtle
.importKey("raw", key, ECDSA_KEY, true, ["verify"])
.then(_ => key);
},
generateKeys() {
return crypto.subtle
.generateKey(ECDH_KEY, true, ["deriveBits"])
.then(cryptoKey =>
Promise.all([
crypto.subtle.exportKey("raw", cryptoKey.publicKey),
crypto.subtle.exportKey("jwk", cryptoKey.privateKey),
])
);
},
/**
* Decrypts a push message.
*
* @throws {CryptoError} if decryption fails.
* @param {JsonWebKey} privateKey The ECDH private key of the subscription
* receiving the message, in JWK form.
* @param {BufferSource} publicKey The ECDH public key of the subscription
* receiving the message, in raw form.
* @param {BufferSource} authenticationSecret The 16-byte shared
* authentication secret of the subscription receiving the message.
* @param {Object} headers The encryption headers from the push server.
* @param {BufferSource} payload The encrypted message payload.
* @returns {Uint8Array} The decrypted message data.
*/
async decrypt(privateKey, publicKey, authenticationSecret, headers, payload) {
if (!headers) {
return null;
}
let encoding = headers.encoding;
if (!headers.encoding) {
throw new CryptoError(
"Missing Content-Encoding header",
BAD_ENCODING_HEADER
);
}
let decoder;
if (encoding == AES128GCM_ENCODING) {
// aes128gcm includes the salt, record size, and sender public key in a
// binary header preceding the ciphertext.
let cryptoParams = getCryptoParamsFromPayload(new Uint8Array(payload));
Glean.webPush.contentEncoding.aes128gcm.add();
decoder = new aes128gcmDecoder(
privateKey,
publicKey,
authenticationSecret,
cryptoParams,
cryptoParams.ciphertext
);
} else if (encoding == AESGCM128_ENCODING || encoding == AESGCM_ENCODING) {
// aesgcm and aesgcm128 include the salt, record size, and sender public
// key in the `Crypto-Key` and `Encryption` HTTP headers.
let cryptoParams = getCryptoParamsFromHeaders(headers);
if (headers.encoding == AESGCM_ENCODING) {
Glean.webPush.contentEncoding.aesgcm.add();
decoder = new aesgcmDecoder(
privateKey,
publicKey,
authenticationSecret,
cryptoParams,
payload
);
} else {
decoder = new aesgcm128Decoder(
privateKey,
publicKey,
cryptoParams,
payload
);
}
}
if (!decoder) {
throw new CryptoError(
"Unsupported Content-Encoding: " + encoding,
BAD_ENCODING_HEADER
);
}
return decoder.decode();
},
/**
* Encrypts a payload suitable for using in a push message. The encryption
* is always done with a record size of 4096 and no padding.
*
* @throws {CryptoError} if encryption fails.
* @param {plaintext} Uint8Array The plaintext to encrypt.
* @param {receiverPublicKey} Uint8Array The public key of the recipient
* of the message as a buffer.
* @param {receiverAuthSecret} Uint8Array The auth secret of the of the
* message recipient as a buffer.
* @param {options} Object Encryption options, used for tests.
* @returns {ciphertext, encoding} The encrypted payload and encoding.
*/
async encrypt(
plaintext,
receiverPublicKey,
receiverAuthSecret,
options = {}
) {
const encoding = options.encoding || AES128GCM_ENCODING;
// We only support one encoding type.
if (encoding != AES128GCM_ENCODING) {
throw new CryptoError(
`Only ${AES128GCM_ENCODING} is supported`,
BAD_ENCODING_HEADER
);
}
// We typically use an ephemeral key for this message, but for testing
// purposes we allow it to be specified.
const senderKeyPair =
options.senderKeyPair ||
(await crypto.subtle.generateKey(ECDH_KEY, true, ["deriveBits"]));
// allowing a salt to be specified is useful for tests.
const salt = options.salt || crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16));
const rs = options.rs === undefined ? 4096 : options.rs;
const encoder = new aes128gcmEncoder(
plaintext,
receiverPublicKey,
receiverAuthSecret,
senderKeyPair,
salt,
rs
);
return encoder.encode();
},
};
// A class for aes128gcm encryption - the only kind we support.
class aes128gcmEncoder {
constructor(
plaintext,
receiverPublicKey,
receiverAuthSecret,
senderKeyPair,
salt,
rs
) {
this.receiverPublicKey = receiverPublicKey;
this.receiverAuthSecret = receiverAuthSecret;
this.senderKeyPair = senderKeyPair;
this.salt = salt;
this.rs = rs;
this.plaintext = plaintext;
}
async encode() {
const sharedSecret = await this.computeSharedSecret(
this.receiverPublicKey,
this.senderKeyPair.privateKey
);
const rawSenderPublicKey = await crypto.subtle.exportKey(
"raw",
this.senderKeyPair.publicKey
);
const [gcmBits, nonce] = await this.deriveKeyAndNonce(
sharedSecret,
rawSenderPublicKey
);
const contentEncryptionKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
"raw",
gcmBits,
"AES-GCM",
false,
["encrypt"]
);
const payloadHeader = this.createHeader(rawSenderPublicKey);
const ciphertextChunks = await this.encrypt(contentEncryptionKey, nonce);
return {
ciphertext: concatArray([payloadHeader, ...ciphertextChunks]),
encoding: "aes128gcm",
};
}
// Perform the actual encryption of the payload.
async encrypt(key, nonce) {
if (this.rs < 18) {
throw new CryptoError("recordsize is too small", BAD_RS_PARAM);
}
let chunks;
if (this.plaintext.byteLength === 0) {
// Send an authentication tag for empty messages.
chunks = [
await crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{
name: "AES-GCM",
iv: generateNonce(nonce, 0),
},
key,
new Uint8Array([2])
),
];
} else {
// Use specified recordsize, though we burn 1 for padding and 16 byte
// overhead.
let inChunks = chunkArray(this.plaintext, this.rs - 1 - 16);
chunks = await Promise.all(
inChunks.map(async function (slice, index) {
let isLast = index == inChunks.length - 1;
let padding = new Uint8Array([isLast ? 2 : 1]);
let input = concatArray([slice, padding]);
return crypto.subtle.encrypt(
{
name: "AES-GCM",
iv: generateNonce(nonce, index),
},
key,
input
);
})
);
}
return chunks;
}
// Note: this is a dupe of aes128gcmDecoder.deriveKeyAndNonce, but tricky
// to rationalize without a larger refactor.
async deriveKeyAndNonce(sharedSecret, senderPublicKey) {
const authKdf = new hkdf(this.receiverAuthSecret, sharedSecret);
const authInfo = concatArray([
AES128GCM_AUTH_INFO,
this.receiverPublicKey,
senderPublicKey,
]);
const prk = await authKdf.extract(authInfo, 32);
const prkKdf = new hkdf(this.salt, prk);
return Promise.all([
prkKdf.extract(AES128GCM_KEY_INFO, 16),
prkKdf.extract(AES128GCM_NONCE_INFO, 12),
]);
}
// Note: this duplicates some of Decoder.computeSharedSecret, but the key
// management is slightly different.
async computeSharedSecret(receiverPublicKey, senderPrivateKey) {
const receiverPublicCryptoKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
"raw",
receiverPublicKey,
ECDH_KEY,
false,
[]
);
return crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
{ name: "ECDH", public: receiverPublicCryptoKey },
senderPrivateKey,
256
);
}
// create aes128gcm's header.
createHeader(key) {
// layout is "salt|32-bit-int|8-bit-int|key"
if (key.byteLength != 65) {
throw new CryptoError("Invalid key length for header", BAD_DH_PARAM);
}
// the 2 ints
let ints = new Uint8Array(5);
let intsv = new DataView(ints.buffer);
intsv.setUint32(0, this.rs); // bigendian
intsv.setUint8(4, key.byteLength);
return concatArray([this.salt, ints, key]);
}
}