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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your
// option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed
// except according to those terms.
use std::{
cell::RefCell,
mem,
net::{IpAddr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr},
rc::Rc,
time::Duration,
};
use neqo_common::{event::Provider, qdebug, Datagram};
use neqo_crypto::{
constants::TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, generate_ech_keys, AuthenticationStatus,
};
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
use test_fixture::datagram;
use test_fixture::{
assertions, assertions::assert_coalesced_0rtt, fixture_init, now, split_datagram, DEFAULT_ADDR,
};
use super::{
super::{Connection, Output, State},
assert_error, connect, connect_force_idle, connect_with_rtt, default_client, default_server,
get_tokens, handshake, maybe_authenticate, resumed_server, send_something,
CountingConnectionIdGenerator, AT_LEAST_PTO, DEFAULT_RTT, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA,
};
use crate::{
connection::{
tests::{new_client, new_server},
AddressValidation,
},
events::ConnectionEvent,
server::ValidateAddress,
stats::FrameStats,
tparams::{self, TransportParameter, MIN_ACK_DELAY},
tracking::DEFAULT_ACK_DELAY,
CloseReason, ConnectionParameters, EmptyConnectionIdGenerator, Error, Pmtud, StreamType,
Version,
};
const ECH_CONFIG_ID: u8 = 7;
const ECH_PUBLIC_NAME: &str = "public.example";
fn full_handshake(pmtud: bool) {
qdebug!("---- client: generate CH");
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().pmtud(pmtud));
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
qdebug!("---- server: CH -> SH, EE, CERT, CV, FIN");
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().pmtud(pmtud));
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), server.plpmtu());
qdebug!("---- client: cert verification");
let out = client.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
assert!(maybe_authenticate(&mut client));
qdebug!("---- client: SH..FIN -> FIN");
let out = client.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
qdebug!("---- server: FIN -> ACKS");
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
qdebug!("---- client: ACKS -> 0");
let out = client.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
if pmtud {
// PMTUD causes a PING probe to be sent here
let pkt = out.dgram().unwrap();
assert!(pkt.len() > client.plpmtu());
} else {
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
}
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_no_pmtud() {
full_handshake(false);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_pmtud() {
full_handshake(true);
}
#[test]
fn handshake_failed_authentication() {
qdebug!("---- client: generate CH");
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("---- server: CH -> SH, EE, CERT, CV, FIN");
let mut server = default_server();
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("---- client: cert verification");
let out = client.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
let authentication_needed = |e| matches!(e, ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded);
assert!(client.events().any(authentication_needed));
qdebug!("---- client: Alert(certificate_revoked)");
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::CertRevoked, now());
qdebug!("---- client: -> Alert(certificate_revoked)");
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("---- server: Alert(certificate_revoked)");
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_error(&client, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoAlert(44)));
assert_error(&server, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::PeerError(300)));
}
#[test]
fn no_alpn() {
fixture_init();
let mut client = Connection::new_client(
"example.com",
&["bad-alpn"],
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
DEFAULT_ADDR,
DEFAULT_ADDR,
ConnectionParameters::default(),
now(),
)
.unwrap();
let mut server = default_server();
handshake(&mut client, &mut server, now(), Duration::new(0, 0));
// TODO (mt): errors are immediate, which means that we never send CONNECTION_CLOSE
// and the client never sees the server's rejection of its handshake.
// assert_error(&client, CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoAlert(120)));
assert_error(&server, &CloseReason::Transport(Error::CryptoAlert(120)));
}
#[test]
fn dup_server_flight1() {
qdebug!("---- client: generate CH");
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
assert_eq!(out.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
qdebug!("Output={:0x?}", out.as_dgram_ref());
qdebug!("---- server: CH -> SH, EE, CERT, CV, FIN");
let mut server = default_server();
let out_to_rep = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out_to_rep.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("Output={:0x?}", out_to_rep.as_dgram_ref());
qdebug!("---- client: cert verification");
let out = client.process(Some(out_to_rep.as_dgram_ref().unwrap()), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("Output={:0x?}", out.as_dgram_ref());
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
assert!(maybe_authenticate(&mut client));
qdebug!("---- client: SH..FIN -> FIN");
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
qdebug!("Output={:0x?}", out.as_dgram_ref());
assert_eq!(3, client.stats().packets_rx);
assert_eq!(0, client.stats().dups_rx);
assert_eq!(1, client.stats().dropped_rx);
qdebug!("---- Dup, ignored");
let out = client.process(out_to_rep.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
qdebug!("Output={:0x?}", out.as_dgram_ref());
// Four packets total received, 1 of them is a dup and one has been dropped because Initial keys
// are dropped. Add 2 counts of the padding that the server adds to Initial packets.
assert_eq!(6, client.stats().packets_rx);
assert_eq!(1, client.stats().dups_rx);
assert_eq!(3, client.stats().dropped_rx);
}
// Test that we split crypto data if they cannot fit into one packet.
// To test this we will use a long server certificate.
#[test]
fn crypto_frame_split() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = Connection::new_server(
test_fixture::LONG_CERT_KEYS,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
ConnectionParameters::default(),
)
.expect("create a server");
let client1 = client.process(None, now());
assert!(client1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// The entire server flight doesn't fit in a single packet because the
// certificate is large, therefore the server will produce 2 packets.
let server1 = server.process(client1.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(server1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let server2 = server.process(None, now());
assert!(server2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let client2 = client.process(server1.as_dgram_ref(), now());
// This is an ack.
assert!(client2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// The client might have the certificate now, so we can't guarantee that
// this will work.
let auth1 = maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Handshaking);
// let server process the ack for the first packet.
let server3 = server.process(client2.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(server3.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
// Consume the second packet from the server.
let client3 = client.process(server2.as_dgram_ref(), now());
// Check authentication.
let auth2 = maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
assert!(auth1 ^ auth2);
// Now client has all data to finish handshake.
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
let client4 = client.process(server3.as_dgram_ref(), now());
// One of these will contain data depending on whether Authentication was completed
// after the first or second server packet.
assert!(client3.as_dgram_ref().is_some() ^ client4.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
mem::drop(server.process(client3.as_dgram_ref(), now()));
mem::drop(server.process(client4.as_dgram_ref(), now()));
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
/// Run a single ChaCha20-Poly1305 test and get a PTO.
#[test]
fn chacha20poly1305() {
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = Connection::new_client(
test_fixture::DEFAULT_SERVER_NAME,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(EmptyConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
DEFAULT_ADDR,
DEFAULT_ADDR,
ConnectionParameters::default(),
now(),
)
.expect("create a default client");
client.set_ciphers(&[TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256]).unwrap();
connect_force_idle(&mut client, &mut server);
}
/// Test that a server can send 0.5 RTT application data.
#[test]
fn send_05rtt() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let c1 = client.process(None, now()).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some());
let s1 = server.process(c1.as_ref(), now()).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s1.len(), server.plpmtu());
// The server should accept writes at this point.
let s2 = send_something(&mut server, now());
// Complete the handshake at the client.
client.process_input(&s1, now());
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
// The client should receive the 0.5-RTT data now.
client.process_input(&s2, now());
let mut buf = vec![0; DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len() + 1];
let stream_id = client
.events()
.find_map(|e| {
if let ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { stream_id } = e {
Some(stream_id)
} else {
None
}
})
.unwrap();
let (l, ended) = client.stream_recv(stream_id, &mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&buf[..l], DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA);
assert!(ended);
}
/// Test that a client buffers 0.5-RTT data when it arrives early.
#[test]
fn reorder_05rtt() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let c1 = client.process(None, now()).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some());
let s1 = server.process(c1.as_ref(), now()).dgram().unwrap();
// The server should accept writes at this point.
let s2 = send_something(&mut server, now());
// We can't use the standard facility to complete the handshake, so
// drive it as aggressively as possible.
client.process_input(&s2, now());
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
// After processing the first packet, the client should go back and
// process the 0.5-RTT packet data, which should make data available.
client.process_input(&s1, now());
// We can't use `maybe_authenticate` here as that consumes events.
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::Ok, now());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
let mut buf = vec![0; DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len() + 1];
let stream_id = client
.events()
.find_map(|e| {
if let ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { stream_id } = e {
Some(stream_id)
} else {
None
}
})
.unwrap();
let (l, ended) = client.stream_recv(stream_id, &mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(&buf[..l], DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA);
assert!(ended);
}
#[test]
fn reorder_05rtt_with_0rtt() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let validation = AddressValidation::new(now(), ValidateAddress::NoToken).unwrap();
let validation = Rc::new(RefCell::new(validation));
server.set_validation(&validation);
let mut now = connect_with_rtt(&mut client, &mut server, now(), RTT);
// Include RTT in sending the ticket or the ticket age reported by the
// client is wrong, which causes the server to reject 0-RTT.
now += RTT / 2;
server.send_ticket(now, &[]).unwrap();
let ticket = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&ticket, now);
let token = get_tokens(&mut client).pop().unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client.enable_resumption(now, token).unwrap();
let mut server = resumed_server(&client);
// Send ClientHello and some 0-RTT.
let c1 = send_something(&mut client, now);
assertions::assert_coalesced_0rtt(&c1[..]);
// Drop the 0-RTT from the coalesced datagram, so that the server
// acknowledges the next 0-RTT packet.
let (c1, _) = split_datagram(&c1);
let c2 = send_something(&mut client, now);
// Handle the first packet and send 0.5-RTT in response. Drop the response.
now += RTT / 2;
mem::drop(server.process(Some(&c1), now).dgram().unwrap());
// The gap in 0-RTT will result in this 0.5 RTT containing an ACK.
server.process_input(&c2, now);
let s2 = send_something(&mut server, now);
// Save the 0.5 RTT.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s2, now);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
// Now PTO at the client and cause the server to re-send handshake packets.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c3 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert_coalesced_0rtt(c3.as_ref().unwrap());
now += RTT / 2;
let s3 = server.process(c3.as_ref(), now).dgram().unwrap();
// The client should be able to process the 0.5 RTT now.
// This should contain an ACK, so we are processing an ACK from the past.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s3, now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c4 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
assert_eq!(client.paths.rtt(), RTT);
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(&c4.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
// Don't check server RTT as it will be massively inflated by a
// poor initial estimate received when the server dropped the
// Initial packet number space.
}
/// Test that a server that coalesces 0.5 RTT with handshake packets
/// doesn't cause the client to drop application data.
#[test]
fn coalesce_05rtt() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
// The first exchange doesn't offer a chance for the server to send.
// So drop the server flight and wait for the PTO.
let c1 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
let s1 = server.process(c1.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s1.is_some());
// Drop the server flight. Then send some data.
let stream_id = server.stream_create(StreamType::UniDi).unwrap();
assert!(server.stream_send(stream_id, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA).is_ok());
assert!(server.stream_close_send(stream_id).is_ok());
// Now after a PTO the client can send another packet.
// The server should then send its entire flight again,
// including the application data, which it sends in a 1-RTT packet.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c2 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c2.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
let s2 = server.process(c2.as_ref(), now).dgram();
// Even though there is a 1-RTT packet at the end of the datagram, the
// flight should be padded to full size.
assert_eq!(s2.as_ref().unwrap().len(), server.plpmtu());
// The client should process the datagram. It can't process the 1-RTT
// packet until authentication completes though. So it saves it.
now += RTT / 2;
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
mem::drop(client.process(s2.as_ref(), now).dgram());
// This packet will contain an ACK, but we can ignore it.
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 3);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
// After (successful) authentication, the packet is processed.
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c3 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c3.is_some());
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0); // No Initial padding.
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 4);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
assert!(client.stats().frame_rx.padding > 0); // Padding uses frames.
// Allow the handshake to complete.
now += RTT / 2;
let s3 = server.process(c3.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s3.is_some());
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
now += RTT / 2;
mem::drop(client.process(s3.as_ref(), now).dgram());
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0); // No dropped packets.
}
#[test]
fn reorder_handshake() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c1 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
let s1 = server.process(c1.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s1.is_some());
// Drop the Initial packet from this.
let (_, s_hs) = split_datagram(&s1.unwrap());
assert!(s_hs.is_some());
// Pass just the handshake packet in and the client can't handle it yet.
// It can only send another Initial packet.
now += RTT / 2;
let dgram = client.process(s_hs.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assertions::assert_initial(dgram.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 1);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 1);
// Get the server to try again.
// Though we currently allow the server to arm its PTO timer, use
// a second client Initial packet to cause it to send again.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c2 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
now += RTT / 2;
let s2 = server.process(c2.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s2.is_some());
let (s_init, s_hs) = split_datagram(&s2.unwrap());
assert!(s_hs.is_some());
// Processing the Handshake packet first should save it.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s_hs.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(client.stats().saved_datagrams, 2);
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 2);
client.process_input(&s_init, now);
// Each saved packet should now be "received" again.
assert_eq!(client.stats().packets_rx, 7);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c3 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c3.is_some());
// Note that though packets were saved and processed very late,
// they don't cause the RTT to change.
now += RTT / 2;
let s3 = server.process(c3.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
// Don't check server RTT estimate as it will be inflated due to
// it making a guess based on retransmissions when it dropped
// the Initial packet number space.
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s3.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(client.paths.rtt(), RTT);
}
#[test]
fn reorder_1rtt() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
const PACKETS: usize = 4; // Many, but not enough to overflow cwnd.
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c1 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c1.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
let s1 = server.process(c1.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s1.is_some());
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s1.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c2 = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c2.is_some());
// Now get a bunch of packets from the client.
// Give them to the server before giving it `c2`.
for _ in 0..PACKETS {
let d = send_something(&mut client, now);
server.process_input(&d, now + RTT / 2);
}
// The server has now received those packets, and saved them.
// The two extra received are Initial + the junk we use for padding.
assert_eq!(server.stats().packets_rx, PACKETS + 2);
assert_eq!(server.stats().saved_datagrams, PACKETS);
assert_eq!(server.stats().dropped_rx, 1);
now += RTT / 2;
let s2 = server.process(c2.as_ref(), now).dgram();
// The server has now received those packets, and saved them.
// The two additional are a Handshake and a 1-RTT (w/ NEW_CONNECTION_ID).
assert_eq!(server.stats().packets_rx, PACKETS * 2 + 4);
assert_eq!(server.stats().saved_datagrams, PACKETS);
assert_eq!(server.stats().dropped_rx, 1);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(server.paths.rtt(), RTT);
now += RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s2.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(client.paths.rtt(), RTT);
// All the stream data that was sent should now be available.
let streams = server
.events()
.filter_map(|e| {
if let ConnectionEvent::RecvStreamReadable { stream_id } = e {
Some(stream_id)
} else {
None
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
assert_eq!(streams.len(), PACKETS);
for stream_id in streams {
let mut buf = vec![0; DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len() + 1];
let (recvd, fin) = server.stream_recv(stream_id, &mut buf).unwrap();
assert_eq!(recvd, DEFAULT_STREAM_DATA.len());
assert!(fin);
}
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
#[test]
fn corrupted_initial() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let d = client.process(None, now()).dgram().unwrap();
let mut corrupted = Vec::from(&d[..]);
// Find the last non-zero value and corrupt that.
let (idx, _) = corrupted
.iter()
.enumerate()
.rev()
.find(|(_, &v)| v != 0)
.unwrap();
corrupted[idx] ^= 0x76;
let dgram = Datagram::new(d.source(), d.destination(), d.tos(), corrupted);
server.process_input(&dgram, now());
// The server should have received two packets,
// the first should be dropped, the second saved.
assert_eq!(server.stats().packets_rx, 2);
assert_eq!(server.stats().dropped_rx, 2);
assert_eq!(server.stats().saved_datagrams, 0);
}
#[test]
// Absent path PTU discovery, max v6 packet size should be PATH_MTU_V6.
fn verify_pkt_honors_mtu() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
connect_force_idle(&mut client, &mut server);
let now = now();
let res = client.process(None, now);
let idle_timeout = ConnectionParameters::default().get_idle_timeout();
assert_eq!(res, Output::Callback(idle_timeout));
// Try to send a large stream and verify first packet is correctly sized
let stream_id = client.stream_create(StreamType::UniDi).unwrap();
assert_eq!(client.stream_send(stream_id, &[0xbb; 2000]).unwrap(), 2000);
let pkt0 = client.process(None, now);
assert!(matches!(pkt0, Output::Datagram(_)));
assert_eq!(pkt0.as_dgram_ref().unwrap().len(), client.plpmtu());
}
#[test]
fn extra_initial_hs() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c_init = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c_init.is_some());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init = server.process(c_init.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s_init.is_some());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
// Drop the Initial packet, keep only the Handshake.
let (_, undecryptable) = split_datagram(&s_init.unwrap());
assert!(undecryptable.is_some());
// Feed the same undecryptable packet into the client a few times.
// Do that EXTRA_INITIALS times and each time the client will emit
// another Initial packet.
for _ in 0..=super::super::EXTRA_INITIALS {
let c_init = client.process(undecryptable.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assertions::assert_initial(c_init.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 10;
}
// After EXTRA_INITIALS, the client stops sending Initial packets.
let nothing = client.process(undecryptable.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(nothing.is_none());
// Until PTO, where another Initial can be used to complete the handshake.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let c_init = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assertions::assert_initial(c_init.as_ref().unwrap(), false);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init = server.process(c_init.as_ref(), now).dgram();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s_init.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let c_fin = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
server.process_input(&c_fin.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[test]
fn extra_initial_invalid_cid() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
let c_init = client.process(None, now).dgram();
assert!(c_init.is_some());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init = server.process(c_init.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(s_init.is_some());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
// If the client receives a packet that contains the wrong connection
// ID, it won't send another Initial.
let (_, hs) = split_datagram(&s_init.unwrap());
let hs = hs.unwrap();
let mut copy = hs.to_vec();
assert_ne!(copy[5], 0); // The DCID should be non-zero length.
copy[6] ^= 0xc4;
let dgram_copy = Datagram::new(hs.destination(), hs.source(), hs.tos(), copy);
let nothing = client.process(Some(&dgram_copy), now).dgram();
assert!(nothing.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn connect_one_version() {
fn connect_v(version: Version) {
fixture_init();
let mut client = Connection::new_client(
test_fixture::DEFAULT_SERVER_NAME,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
DEFAULT_ADDR,
DEFAULT_ADDR,
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(version, vec![version]),
now(),
)
.unwrap();
let mut server = Connection::new_server(
test_fixture::DEFAULT_KEYS,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
ConnectionParameters::default().versions(version, vec![version]),
)
.unwrap();
connect_force_idle(&mut client, &mut server);
assert_eq!(client.version(), version);
assert_eq!(server.version(), version);
}
for v in Version::all() {
println!("Connecting with {v:?}");
connect_v(v);
}
}
#[test]
fn anti_amplification() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let mut now = now();
// With a gigantic transport parameter, the server is unable to complete
// the handshake within the amplification limit.
let very_big = TransportParameter::Bytes(vec![0; Pmtud::default_plpmtu(DEFAULT_ADDR.ip()) * 3]);
server.set_local_tparam(0xce16, very_big).unwrap();
let c_init = client.process_output(now).dgram();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let s_init1 = server.process(c_init.as_ref(), now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s_init1.len(), server.plpmtu());
let s_init2 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s_init2.len(), server.plpmtu());
let s_init3 = server.process_output(now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(s_init3.len(), server.plpmtu());
let cb = server.process_output(now).callback();
// We are blocked by the amplification limit now.
assert_eq!(cb, server.conn_params.get_idle_timeout());
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&s_init1, now);
client.process_input(&s_init2, now);
let ack_count = client.stats().frame_tx.ack;
let frame_count = client.stats().frame_tx.all();
let ack = client.process(Some(&s_init3), now).dgram().unwrap();
assert!(!maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); // No need yet.
// The client sends a padded datagram, with just ACK for Handshake.
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ack, ack_count + 1);
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.all(), frame_count + 1);
assert_ne!(ack.len(), client.plpmtu()); // Not padded (it includes Handshake).
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
let remainder = server.process(Some(&ack), now).dgram();
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
client.process_input(&remainder.unwrap(), now);
assert!(maybe_authenticate(&mut client)); // OK, we have all of it.
let fin = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Connected);
now += DEFAULT_RTT / 2;
server.process_input(&fin.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "disable-encryption"))]
#[test]
fn garbage_initial() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = default_server();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram().unwrap();
let (initial, rest) = split_datagram(&dgram);
let mut corrupted = Vec::from(&initial[..initial.len() - 1]);
corrupted.push(initial[initial.len() - 1] ^ 0xb7);
corrupted.extend_from_slice(rest.as_ref().map_or(&[], |r| &r[..]));
let garbage = datagram(corrupted);
assert_eq!(Output::None, server.process(Some(&garbage), now()));
}
#[test]
fn drop_initial_packet_from_wrong_address() {
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let mut server = default_server();
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let p = out.dgram().unwrap();
let dgram = Datagram::new(
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2)), 443),
p.destination(),
p.tos(),
&p[..],
);
let out = client.process(Some(&dgram), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn drop_handshake_packet_from_wrong_address() {
let mut client = default_client();
let out = client.process(None, now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let mut server = default_server();
let out = server.process(out.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let (s_in, s_hs) = split_datagram(&out.dgram().unwrap());
// Pass the initial packet.
mem::drop(client.process(Some(&s_in), now()).dgram());
let p = s_hs.unwrap();
let dgram = Datagram::new(
SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::new(0xfe80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2)), 443),
p.destination(),
p.tos(),
&p[..],
);
let out = client.process(Some(&dgram), now());
assert!(out.as_dgram_ref().is_none());
}
#[test]
fn ech() {
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client.client_enable_ech(server.ech_config()).unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(client.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
assert!(server.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
}
fn damaged_ech_config(config: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut cfg = Vec::from(config);
// Ensure that the version and config_id is correct.
assert_eq!(cfg[2], 0xfe);
assert_eq!(cfg[3], 0x0d);
assert_eq!(cfg[6], ECH_CONFIG_ID);
// Change the config_id so that the server doesn't recognize it.
cfg[6] ^= 0x94;
cfg
}
#[test]
fn ech_retry() {
fixture_init();
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client
.client_enable_ech(damaged_ech_config(server.ech_config()))
.unwrap();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now()).dgram();
client.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now());
let auth_event = ConnectionEvent::EchFallbackAuthenticationNeeded {
public_name: String::from(ECH_PUBLIC_NAME),
};
assert!(client.events().any(|e| e == auth_event));
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::Ok, now());
assert!(client.state().error().is_some());
// Tell the server about the error.
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(
server.state().error(),
Some(&CloseReason::Transport(Error::PeerError(0x100 + 121)))
);
let Some(CloseReason::Transport(Error::EchRetry(updated_config))) = client.state().error()
else {
panic!(
"Client state should be failed with EchRetry, is {:?}",
client.state()
);
};
let mut server = default_server();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client.client_enable_ech(updated_config).unwrap();
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert!(client.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(server.tls_info().unwrap().ech_accepted());
assert!(client.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
assert!(server.tls_preinfo().unwrap().ech_accepted().unwrap());
}
#[test]
fn ech_retry_fallback_rejected() {
fixture_init();
let mut server = default_server();
let (sk, pk) = generate_ech_keys().unwrap();
server
.server_enable_ech(ECH_CONFIG_ID, ECH_PUBLIC_NAME, &sk, &pk)
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
client
.client_enable_ech(damaged_ech_config(server.ech_config()))
.unwrap();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now()).dgram();
client.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now());
let auth_event = ConnectionEvent::EchFallbackAuthenticationNeeded {
public_name: String::from(ECH_PUBLIC_NAME),
};
assert!(client.events().any(|e| e == auth_event));
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::PolicyRejection, now());
assert!(client.state().error().is_some());
if let Some(CloseReason::Transport(Error::EchRetry(_))) = client.state().error() {
panic!("Client should not get EchRetry error");
}
// Pass the error on.
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(
server.state().error(),
Some(&CloseReason::Transport(Error::PeerError(298)))
); // A bad_certificate alert.
}
#[test]
fn bad_min_ack_delay() {
const EXPECTED_ERROR: CloseReason = CloseReason::Transport(Error::TransportParameterError);
let mut server = default_server();
let max_ad = u64::try_from(DEFAULT_ACK_DELAY.as_micros()).unwrap();
server
.set_local_tparam(MIN_ACK_DELAY, TransportParameter::Integer(max_ad + 1))
.unwrap();
let mut client = default_client();
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now()).dgram();
client.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now());
client.authenticated(AuthenticationStatus::Ok, now());
assert_eq!(client.state().error(), Some(&EXPECTED_ERROR));
let dgram = client.process_output(now()).dgram();
server.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now());
assert_eq!(
server.state().error(),
Some(&CloseReason::Transport(Error::PeerError(
Error::TransportParameterError.code()
)))
);
}
/// Ensure that the client probes correctly if it only receives Initial packets
/// from the server.
#[test]
fn only_server_initial() {
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut now = now();
let client_dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
// Now fetch two flights of messages from the server.
let server_dgram1 = server.process(client_dgram.as_ref(), now).dgram();
let server_dgram2 = server.process_output(now + AT_LEAST_PTO).dgram();
// Only pass on the Initial from the first. We should get a Handshake in return.
let (initial, handshake) = split_datagram(&server_dgram1.unwrap());
assert!(handshake.is_some());
// The client will not acknowledge the Initial as it discards keys.
// It sends a Handshake probe instead, containing just a PING frame.
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ping, 0);
let probe = client.process(Some(&initial), now).dgram();
assertions::assert_handshake(&probe.unwrap());
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, 0);
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ping, 1);
let (initial, handshake) = split_datagram(&server_dgram2.unwrap());
assert!(handshake.is_some());
// The same happens after a PTO, even though the client will discard the Initial packet.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ping, 1);
let discarded = client.stats().dropped_rx;
let probe = client.process(Some(&initial), now).dgram();
assertions::assert_handshake(&probe.unwrap());
assert_eq!(client.stats().frame_tx.ping, 2);
assert_eq!(client.stats().dropped_rx, discarded + 1);
// Pass the Handshake packet and complete the handshake.
client.process_input(&handshake.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now).dgram();
client.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
}
// Collect a few spare Initial packets as the handshake is exchanged.
// Later, replay those packets to see if they result in additional probes; they should not.
#[test]
fn no_extra_probes_after_confirmed() {
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut now = now();
// First, collect a client Initial.
let spare_initial = client.process_output(now).dgram();
assert!(spare_initial.is_some());
// Collect ANOTHER client Initial.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO;
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let (replay_initial, _) = split_datagram(dgram.as_ref().unwrap());
// Finally, run the handshake.
now += AT_LEAST_PTO * 2;
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now).dgram();
// The server should have dropped the Initial keys now, so passing in the Initial
// should elicit a retransmit rather than having it completely ignored.
let spare_handshake = server.process(Some(&replay_initial), now).dgram();
assert!(spare_handshake.is_some());
client.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now);
maybe_authenticate(&mut client);
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now).dgram();
client.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now);
assert_eq!(*client.state(), State::Confirmed);
assert_eq!(*server.state(), State::Confirmed);
let probe = server.process(spare_initial.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(probe.is_none());
let probe = client.process(spare_handshake.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assert!(probe.is_none());
}
#[test]
fn implicit_rtt_server() {
const RTT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
let mut server = default_server();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut now = now();
let dgram = client.process_output(now).dgram();
now += RTT / 2;
let dgram = server.process(dgram.as_ref(), now).dgram();
now += RTT / 2;
let dgram = client.process(dgram.as_ref(), now).dgram();
assertions::assert_handshake(dgram.as_ref().unwrap());
now += RTT / 2;
server.process_input(&dgram.unwrap(), now);
// The server doesn't receive any acknowledgments, but it can infer
// an RTT estimate from having discarded the Initial packet number space.
assert_eq!(server.stats().rtt, RTT);
}
#[test]
fn emit_authentication_needed_once() {
let mut client = default_client();
let mut server = Connection::new_server(
test_fixture::LONG_CERT_KEYS,
test_fixture::DEFAULT_ALPN,
Rc::new(RefCell::new(CountingConnectionIdGenerator::default())),
ConnectionParameters::default(),
)
.expect("create a server");
let client1 = client.process(None, now());
assert!(client1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
// The entire server flight doesn't fit in a single packet because the
// certificate is large, therefore the server will produce 2 packets.
let server1 = server.process(client1.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert!(server1.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let server2 = server.process(None, now());
assert!(server2.as_dgram_ref().is_some());
let authentication_needed_count = |client: &mut Connection| {
client
.events()
.filter(|e| matches!(e, ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded))
.count()
};
// Upon receiving the first packet, the client has the server certificate,
// but not yet all required handshake data. It moves to
// `HandshakeState::AuthenticationPending` and emits a
// `ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded` event.
//
// Note that this is a tiny bit fragile in that it depends on having a certificate
// that is within a fairly narrow range of sizes. It has to fit in a single
// packet, but be large enough that the CertificateVerify message does not
// also fit in the same packet. Our default test setup achieves this, but
// changes to the setup might invalidate this test.
_ = client.process(server1.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert_eq!(1, authentication_needed_count(&mut client));
assert!(client.peer_certificate().is_some());
// The `AuthenticationNeeded` event is still pending a call to
// `Connection::authenticated`. On receiving the second packet from the
// server, the client must not emit a another
// `ConnectionEvent::AuthenticationNeeded`.
_ = client.process(server2.as_dgram_ref(), now());
assert_eq!(0, authentication_needed_count(&mut client));
}
#[test]
fn client_initial_retransmits_identical() {
let mut now = now();
let mut client = default_client();
// Force the client to retransmit its Initial packet a number of times and make sure the
// retranmissions are identical to the original. Also, verify the PTO durations.
for i in 1..=5 {
let ci = client.process(None, now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(ci.len(), client.plpmtu());
assert_eq!(
client.stats().frame_tx,
FrameStats {
crypto: i,
..Default::default()
}
);
let pto = client.process(None, now).callback();
assert_eq!(pto, DEFAULT_RTT * 3 * (1 << (i - 1)));
now += pto;
}
}
#[test]
fn server_initial_retransmits_identical() {
let mut now = now();
let mut client = default_client();
let mut ci = client.process(None, now).dgram();
// Force the server to retransmit its Initial packet a number of times and make sure the
// retranmissions are identical to the original. Also, verify the PTO durations.
let mut server = default_server();
let mut total_ptos: Duration = Duration::from_secs(0);
for i in 1..=3 {
let si = server.process(ci.take().as_ref(), now).dgram().unwrap();
assert_eq!(si.len(), server.plpmtu());
assert_eq!(
server.stats().frame_tx,
FrameStats {
crypto: i * 2,
ack: i,
..Default::default()
}
);
let pto = server.process(None, now).callback();
if i < 3 {
assert_eq!(pto, DEFAULT_RTT * 3 * (1 << (i - 1)));
} else {
// Server is amplification-limited after three (re)transmissions.
assert_eq!(pto, server.conn_params.get_idle_timeout() - total_ptos);
}
now += pto;
total_ptos += pto;
}
}
#[test]
fn grease_quic_bit_transport_parameter() {
fn get_remote_tp(conn: &Connection) -> bool {
conn.tps
.borrow()
.remote
.as_ref()
.unwrap()
.get_empty(tparams::GREASE_QUIC_BIT)
}
for client_grease in [true, false] {
for server_grease in [true, false] {
let mut client = new_client(ConnectionParameters::default().grease(client_grease));
let mut server = new_server(ConnectionParameters::default().grease(server_grease));
connect(&mut client, &mut server);
assert_eq!(client_grease, get_remote_tp(&server));
assert_eq!(server_grease, get_remote_tp(&client));
}
}
}