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Test Info: Warnings
- This test gets skipped with pattern: os == 'win' && msix
- Manifest: security/manager/ssl/tests/unit/xpcshell.toml
/* -*- indent-tabs-mode: nil; js-indent-level: 2 -*- */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
"use strict";
// These tests ensure content signatures are working correctly.
const TEST_DATA_DIR = "test_content_signing/";
const ONECRL_NAME = "oneCRL-signer.mozilla.org";
const ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME = "remotenewtab.content-signature.mozilla.org";
var VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM = Services.telemetry.getHistogramById(
"CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_STATUS"
);
var ERROR_HISTOGRAM = Services.telemetry.getKeyedHistogramById(
"CONTENT_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_ERRORS"
);
// Enable the collection (during test) for all products so even products
// that don't collect the data will be able to run the test without failure.
Services.prefs.setBoolPref(
"toolkit.telemetry.testing.overrideProductsCheck",
true
);
function getSignatureVerifier() {
return Cc["@mozilla.org/security/contentsignatureverifier;1"].getService(
Ci.nsIContentSignatureVerifier
);
}
function getCertHash(name) {
let cert = constructCertFromFile(`test_content_signing/${name}.pem`);
return cert.sha256Fingerprint.replace(/:/g, "");
}
function loadChain(prefix, names) {
let chain = [];
for (let name of names) {
let filename = `${prefix}_${name}.pem`;
chain.push(readFile(do_get_file(filename)));
}
return chain;
}
function check_telemetry(expected_index, expected, expectedId) {
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
let expected_value = 0;
if (i == expected_index) {
expected_value = expected;
}
let errorSnapshot = ERROR_HISTOGRAM.snapshot();
for (let k in errorSnapshot) {
// We clear the histogram every time so there should be only this one
// category.
equal(k, expectedId);
equal(errorSnapshot[k].values[i] || 0, expected_value);
}
equal(
VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.snapshot().values[i] || 0,
expected_value,
"count " +
i +
": " +
VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.snapshot().values[i] +
" expected " +
expected_value
);
}
VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.clear();
ERROR_HISTOGRAM.clear();
}
add_task(async function run_test() {
// set up some data
const DATA = readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + "test.txt"));
const GOOD_SIGNATURE =
"p384ecdsa=" +
readFile(do_get_file(TEST_DATA_DIR + "test.txt.signature")).trim();
const BAD_SIGNATURE =
"p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2r" +
"UWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1G" +
"q25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L";
let remoteNewTabChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
"remote_newtab_ee",
"int",
]);
let oneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
"onecrl_ee",
"int",
]);
let oneCRLBadKeyChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
"onecrl_wrong_key_ee",
"int",
]);
let noSANChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
"onecrl_no_SAN_ee",
"int",
]);
let expiredOneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
"onecrl_ee_expired",
"int",
]);
let notValidYetOneCRLChain = loadChain(TEST_DATA_DIR + "content_signing", [
"onecrl_ee_not_valid_yet",
"int",
]);
// Check signature verification works without throwing when using the wrong
// root
VERIFICATION_HISTOGRAM.clear();
let chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
let verifier = getSignatureVerifier();
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIContentSignatureVerifier.ContentSignatureProdRoot
)),
"using the wrong root, signatures should fail to verify but not throw."
);
// Check for generic chain building error.
check_telemetry(6, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
// Check good signatures from good certificates with the correct SAN
ok(
await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
),
"A OneCRL signature should verify with the OneCRL chain"
);
let chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
ok(
await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain2,
ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
),
"A newtab signature should verify with the newtab chain"
);
// Check for valid signature
check_telemetry(0, 2, getCertHash("content_signing_remote_newtab_ee"));
// Check a bad signature when a good chain is provided
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
BAD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A bad signature should not verify"
);
// Check for invalid signature
check_telemetry(1, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
// one used to create the signature
let badKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
badKeyChain,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong"
);
// Check for wrong key in cert.
check_telemetry(9, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_wrong_key_ee"));
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but a different key than the
// one used to create the signature (this time, an RSA key)
let rsaKeyChain = oneCRLBadKeyChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
rsaKeyChain,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the signing key is wrong (RSA)"
);
// Check for wrong key in cert.
check_telemetry(9, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_wrong_key_ee"));
// Check a good signature from cert with good SAN but with no path to root
let missingInt = [oneCRLChain[0], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
missingInt,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the chain is incomplete (missing int)"
);
// Check for generic chain building error.
check_telemetry(6, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
// Check good signatures from good certificates with the wrong SANs
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ABOUT_NEWTAB_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A OneCRL signature should not verify if we require the newtab SAN"
);
// Check for invalid EE cert.
check_telemetry(7, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
chain2 = remoteNewTabChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain2,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A newtab signature should not verify if we require the OneCRL SAN"
);
// Check for invalid EE cert.
check_telemetry(7, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_remote_newtab_ee"));
// Check good signatures with good chains with some other invalid names
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
"",
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match an empty name"
);
// Check for invalid EE cert.
check_telemetry(7, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee"));
// Test expired certificate.
let chainExpired = expiredOneCRLChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chainExpired,
"",
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the signing certificate is expired"
);
// Check for expired cert.
check_telemetry(4, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee_expired"));
// Test not valid yet certificate.
let chainNotValidYet = notValidYetOneCRLChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chainNotValidYet,
"",
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the signing certificate is not valid yet"
);
// Check for not yet valid cert.
check_telemetry(5, 1, getCertHash("content_signing_onecrl_ee_not_valid_yet"));
let relatedName = "subdomain." + ONECRL_NAME;
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
relatedName,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a related name"
);
let randomName =
"\xb1\x9bU\x1c\xae\xaa3\x19H\xdb\xed\xa1\xa1\xe0\x81\xfb" +
"\xb2\x8f\x1cP\xe5\x8b\x9c\xc2s\xd3\x1f\x8e\xbbN";
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
randomName,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a random name"
);
// check good signatures with chains that have strange or missing SANs
chain1 = noSANChain.join("\n");
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A signature should not verify if the SANs do not match a supplied name"
);
// Check malformed signature data
chain1 = oneCRLChain.join("\n");
let bad_signatures = [
// wrong length
"p384ecdsa=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi-" +
"7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L==",
// incorrectly encoded
"p384ecdsa='WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ecHiXoi" +
"-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L=",
// missing directive
"other_directive=WqRXFQ7tnlVufpg7A-ZavXvWd2Zln0o4woHBy26C2rUWM4GJke4pE8ec" +
"HiXoi-7KnZXty6Pe3s4o3yAIyKDP9jUC52Ek1Gq25j_X703nP5rk5gM1qz5Fe-qCWakPPl6L",
// actually sha256 with RSA
"p384ecdsa=XS_jiQsS5qlzQyUKaA1nAnQn_OvxhvDfKybflB8Xe5gNH1wNmPGK1qN-jpeTfK" +
"6ob3l3gCTXrsMnOXMeht0kPP3wLfVgXbuuO135pQnsv0c-ltRMWLe56Cm4S4Z6E7WWKLPWaj" +
"jhAcG5dZxjffP9g7tuPP4lTUJztyc4d1z_zQZakEG7R0vN7P5_CaX9MiMzP4R7nC3H4Ba6yi" +
"yjlGvsZwJ_C5zDQzWWs95czUbMzbDScEZ_7AWnidw91jZn-fUK3xLb6m-Zb_b4GAqZ-vnXIf" +
"LpLB1Nzal42BQZn7i4rhAldYdcVvy7rOMlsTUb5Zz6vpVW9LCT9lMJ7Sq1xbU-0g==",
];
for (let badSig of bad_signatures) {
await Assert.rejects(
verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
badSig,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
),
/NS_ERROR/,
`Bad or malformed signature "${badSig}" should be rejected`
);
}
// Check malformed and missing certificate chain data
let chainSuffix = [oneCRLChain[1], oneCRLChain[2]].join("\n");
let badChains = [
// no data
"",
// completely wrong data
"blah blah \n blah",
];
let badSections = [
// data that looks like PEM but isn't
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nBSsPRlYp5+gaFMRIczwUzaioRfteCjr94xyz0g==\n",
// data that will start to parse but won't base64decode
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
// data with garbage outside of PEM sections
"this data is garbage\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nnon-base64-stuff\n" +
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
];
for (let badSection of badSections) {
// ensure we test each bad section on its own...
badChains.push(badSection);
// ... and as part of a chain with good certificates
badChains.push(badSection + "\n" + chainSuffix);
}
for (let badChain of badChains) {
await Assert.rejects(
verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
badChain,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
),
/NS_ERROR/,
`Bad chain data starting "${badChain.substring(0, 80)}" ` +
"should be rejected"
);
}
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA + "appended data",
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A good signature should not verify if the data is tampered with (append)"
);
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
"prefixed data" + DATA,
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A good signature should not verify if the data is tampered with (prefix)"
);
ok(
!(await verifier.asyncVerifyContentSignature(
DATA.replace(/e/g, "i"),
GOOD_SIGNATURE,
chain1,
ONECRL_NAME,
Ci.nsIX509CertDB.AppXPCShellRoot
)),
"A good signature should not verify if the data is tampered with (modify)"
);
});